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International School Director Turnover as Influenced by
School Board/Director Relationship
By Zakariya S. Palsha
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School of Education

In recent years, public school superintendents have faced increased demands from
rigorous federal and state accountability standards. Yet, researchers have reported that
academic improvement does not happen by chance but rather through effective leaders
with ample time to implement broad, sustainable reform. The purpose of this study was to
examine the self-reported causes of turnover of international school directors,
specifically, whether the relationship between the school board and the international
school director is linked to length of tenure of the international director. The theoretical
framework that addresses superintendent turnover as influenced by internal board
dynamics, including school board/superintendent relationship, is the Decision Output
Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005). Descriptive data seem to indicate the quality of relationship
between the international school director and the school board as a possible factor for
international school directors to leave their previous position. There was a correlation
between "quality of relationship" and "length of tenure," rs (120) = -.419, p < .001. There
seems to be evidence that when the top administrator leaves, the entire organizational
structure is affected, regardless of the professional setting. It seems evident that the
understanding of building a positive relationship between the international school director

and school board, founded on trust and respect, is one that has a far-reaching impact on
the length of tenure.

KEYWORDS: Wirt and Kirst, Decision Output Theory; superintendent turnover, length of
tenure; leadership turnover, length of tenure; international school director turnover,
length of tenure.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Turnover of the top administrator in an organization is equivalent to a newly
elected president. Change is often the order of the day, even if the new president is from
the same political party. The new leader usually possesses and enacts certain
individualities, ethos, goals, and even foibles; different from the former president.
Unlike a new president, the causes of turnover and the reasons for tenure of the
top administrators of school districts (Cooper, Fusarelli, & Carella, 2000; Kowalski,
1999) can be even more difficult to identify because the incumbent may be removed by a
simple majority vote of the respective board of directors. Contrastingly, the causes for the
removal of the president are limited by a Constitution. A Constitution often provides for
both stability and change. It is known that the president may be removed by the will of
the electorate. However, once elected, it is extremely difficult to remove a president.
In a case where a president resigns, dies, or is unable to carry out their duties, a
Constitution provides a stable method for the transfer of power. Conversely, this type of
systematic stability does not exist in school systems. Further, international school
environments in particular, fail to provide even basic due process elements with regards
to director turnover.
Turnover is a reality among both superintendents and international school
directors. Although each position is quite unique in terms of degrees, certification, and
management styles, each is also very much related. Some skills and duties germane to
both positions are long-range planning, human resource management, fiduciary decisionmaking, and public relations, to name a few. The differences lie more in the environment
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in which they operate and the purpose or the motivation of their positions. School
districts in the United States that prepare the young to enter the workforce or to go on to
higher education are vastly different from non-profit schools that typically exist to meet a
human service need or to accomplish an altruistic mission. Both contrast greatly from forprofit international schools motivated to make money and increase their market share of
the service they provide.
Turnover and the tenure in their previous position of top school administrators can
be volatile (Alsbury, 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2015; Alsbury & Whitaker, 2015; Chingos,
Whitehurst, & Lindquist, 2014). Opinion polls, political pundits, and the success or
failure of foreign and domestic policies and decisions seem to influence the voting public
and affect a president’s length of stay in office. While a school director’s tenure may be
influenced by the opinions of staff members, parents, community public relations, and
selective outcome measures, like test scores; a director’s dismissal or pressured
resignation may depend more upon the director’s relationship with members of their
school board (Alsbury, 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2015; Alsbury & Gore, 2015; Mountford,
2008).
Using a theoretical framework of the Decision-Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst,
2005), this study explored possible reasons for international school director tenure in
previous positions. To date, only two studies have measured explicitly the reasons for the
turnover of international school directors (Hodgson & Chuck, 2015; Moos & Paulsen,
2014). This study narrowed the focus on the relationship between school boards and
international school directors through use of a questionnaire of international school
directors from South America, Europe, Africa, Asia and Southeast Asia.
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Historical Context
The superintendency is an occupation with very little security (Fusarelli, Cooper,
& Carella, 2003; Kowalski, McCord, Petersen, Young, & Ellerson, 2010), fewer benefits
than similar jobs in the private sector, and one that faces increased public criticism and
scrutiny, and increasing complexity (Goodman & Zimmerman, 2000; Hoyle, Bjork,
Collier, & Glass, 2005; Kowalski et al., 2010). Indeed, the role of the school
superintendent could be characterized as daunting and challenging. Due to the increasing
challenges of the job, concerns about the availability of quality candidates to fill
superintendent vacancies have persisted (Cooper et al., 2000; Hoyle et al., 2005; Kowalski
et al., 2010; Waters & Marzano, 2007). In recent years, public school superintendents
have faced increased demands from federal accountability mandates (U.S. Department of
Education, 2002, 2009) and rigorous state accountability standards.
Some believe the complexity of the superintendent position and the declining
number of qualified candidates for the position may present a problem for districts
striving to improve student performance, especially among underrepresented populations.
This concern emanates from the presumption that not only the quality of superintendent
leadership (Waters & Marzano, 2007), but that stable tenure of a superintendent
(Alsbury, 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2015; Alsbury & Whitaker, 2015) influences student
achievement. Fullan (2002) suggested that academic improvement does not happen by
chance but rather through effective school and district leaders with ample time to
implement broad, sustainable reform.
However, the link between superintendent leadership and student performance is
questioned. Some have argued that by supporting building-level leadership (principals),
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the superintendent is ultimately accountable for the success or failure of student
achievement—which in today’s world is measured through state standardized
assessments such as the SBA (Smarter Balanced Assessment), HSPE (High School
Proficiency Exam) and EOC (End of Course) assessments in Washington State.
Unfortunately, Hoyle and colleagues (2005) expressed that the success or failure of
various superintendents (as indicated by tenure) is an ambiguous and not thoroughly
researched subject.
There seems to be evidence that when the top administrator leaves, the entire
organizational structure is affected, regardless of the professional setting (Alsbury,
2008a, 2015; Alsbury &Whitaker, 2015; Waters & Marzano, 2007). While existing
studies have concluded that turnover of the top administrator often revolves around poor
board/executive relations, regardless of the reason for turnover, this phenomenon may
cause difficulties in recruiting and securing the next top management position. Although
a school organization is in crisis, it may present a lucrative, yet arduous opportunity for
the successor who is hired to solve these acute problems.
Theoretical Constructs
As noted above, several theories are proposed to help explain the political
environment within schools and their communities. Theories include the Dissatisfaction
Theory of Democracy (Iannaccone & Lutz, 1970), the Continuous Participation Theory
(Zeigler & Jennings, 1974), and the Decision Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005). Each
of these theories contrasts in their foundation as to whether the governance of education
is truly democratic and responsive to, or influenced by, the community. As it pertains to
the focus of this study, these theories also provide support for the variables that most
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likely influence superintendent and school director turnover. These theories are based
upon and describe the political reality for school boards in the U.S. and cannot be directly
applied to the study of international directors. However, the Decision Output Theory
(Wirt & Kirst, 2005), provides a framework that can be used to define the effect of school
board/director relationship and director tenure in this study.
Dissatisfaction Theory of Democracy. In 1962, Lutz conducted a case study
utilizing 25 years of historical data, an 18-month participant observer experience, and a
three-year follow-up observation. The Lutz dissertation was conducted at Washington
University in St. Louis, Missouri. Two years later, the research continued at the
Claremont Graduate School, where Iannaccone and Lutz (1994) made the theoretical
argument they later named the Dissatisfaction Theory. Using the theoretical basis
described in the writings of Mosca (1939) and Key (1955), they focused on a key
component that became the Turning Point Election Period (TPEP). Iannaccone and Lutz
described a TPEP as a multi-step process they tested and validated. Afterwards, many
other studies validated and further developed the Dissatisfaction Theory (Iannaccone &
Lutz, 1970).
The Dissatisfaction Theory of Democracy (Iannaccone & Lutz, 1970) suggests
that local school board governance is a cyclic democratic process. In a public school
district, local community politics directly affect school board members and
superintendents. Public dissatisfaction can result in school board member defeat at the
polls or school board members being forced into early resignation or retirement. In the
absence of tenure laws for administrators in many states, superintendents lack protections
and are vulnerable to replacement. Frequent superintendent turnover causes discontinuity
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in organizational goals, policy, and procedures, that can negatively affect the entire
organization (Glass & Franceschini, 2007; Grady and Bryant, 1989). In addition, rapid
turnover of top school officials can impede the achievement of positive school reform
(Glass & Franceschini, 2007).
As it pertains to the topic of focus in this study, Dissatisfaction Theory
(Iannaccone & Lutz, 1970) does not speak directly to the relationship between the board
and superintendent as a cause of superintendent turnover. Instead, Dissatisfaction Theory
indicates that the causes for superintendent turnover would be the result of an event of
politically motivated school board turnover. Thus, superintendent turnover is not
specifically due to a souring relationship between the superintendent and the existing
school board, but rather an effect caused by decline in community satisfaction and the
subsequent defeat and pressured resignation of the school board.
Continuous Participation Theory of Democracy. The Continuous Participation
Theory (Zeigler & Jennings, 1974) rejects the premise of the Dissatisfaction Theory that
school boards operate in a democratic fashion. The theory suggests that low voter turnout
and a lack of genuine competitors for school board seats is typical in local school board
elections. This theory suggests that the lack of participation by the community prevents
the local school board from being truly representative of their constituency; therefore, it
is undemocratic in its composition and function.
Jennings and Ziegler’s (1968) study consisted of 581 board members and 94
superintendents in 96 school districts across the United States. They looked at the degree
school boards were responsive to the public and the extent to which boards act on the
basis of public needs. The researchers relied upon a definition of democracy based upon
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continuous participation (with competition during elections) in the political area. In other
words, the theory focuses primarily on the turnout rate of voters to school board elections
who use their electoral authority to elect a school board that represents them as
constituents. The degree to which school boards exemplify democratic principles was
dependent upon the degree to which school boards were responsive to the preferences of
their local community to determine: the representative nature of the school board team;
recruitment and selection process of school board members; relationship between the
board members and the public; and the relationship between the board members and the
superintendent. Basically, in the ideal democratic scenario, voters select the school board
in accordance with constituency preferences, the board formulates policies in response to
the community, and the superintendent implements said policies. Ziegler and Jennings
concluded that evidence suggested this idea is not fully recognized in school districts.
The Continuous Participation Theory (Zeigler & Jennings, 1974) concludes that
school boards do not necessarily represent their constituents. Regarding this study, the
Continuous Participation Theory provides no direct evidence regarding the relationship
between the board and the superintendent or the reason for the turnover of a
superintendent. However, because it contends that the board maintains a status quo and
does not represent its community, the likelihood of a souring relationship between the
superintendent and the board is diminished. Indeed, a stable board would be much easier
for a superintendent to get to know and to maintain a positive relationship with. In this
theory, the primary reasons for superintendent turnover would be apolitical turnover
predicated upon moves to larger districts with more pay or due to community changes
leading to school board turnover.
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Decision Output Theory. The Decision Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005)
suggests the governance of local school boards is affected by the limitations of economic
and personnel resources in local school districts. Another significant notion is the low
number of citizens who actually provide input to school boards. School boards decide
which actions to take from few options, and with limited resources, causing subjectivity
and inconsistency in their decisions. Wirt and Kirst’s (2005) model assumes educational
policy-making is innately a political process that allocates value preferences thorough
material (i.e., curriculum). The democratic nature of this process is determined by the
interrelationships between the political system and other subsystems of the social
environment. Wirt and Kirst illustrated these links by describing how subsystems
generate inputs of demands on and supports of the political [school] system. They
suggested the school system converts these inputs or demands into public decisions or
outputs, which in turn feed allocated values back into the social environment. Since
school districts lack sufficient resources to meet each demand placed upon them by the
community, they must choose which group’s demands to act upon and which to dismiss.
As a result, the school board may or may not meet the needs of many of its constituency.
Their choice of which concern to address is generally dependent on whether or not the
school board has a clear understanding of the major issues in their respective
communities.
The Decision Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005) is the theory most likely to
predict that superintendent turnover may be caused by the relationship between the board
and superintendent. This theory deals with the internal interactions within the school
board as they debate the management of limited resources. This theory suggests that
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perhaps a superintendent and school board relationship could sour due to a disagreement
over policy decisions and allocation of resources. The possibility of superintendent
turnover caused by relationship issues (and not only board turnover) is supported more by
the Decision Output theory than by either the Dissatisfaction Theory (Iannaccone & Lutz,
1970) or the Continuous Participation Theory.
Figure 1 depicts the various theories associated with superintendent turnover and
their underlying differences, yet all leading to a very similar outcome of turnover by the
superintendent or the school board (as it states in the Dissatisfaction Theory). As
illustrated in Figure 1, the Decision Output Theory is the theory that can best predict the
relationship between the school board and the superintendent as a possible cause of
turnover.
Dissatisfaction
Theory
Unhappy Voters

Forced School
Board Turnover

Forced
Superintendent
Turnover due to
School Board
Turnover

Board Turnover

Continuous
Participation Theory

Decision-Output Theory

Apathetic /
Disenfranchised
Voters

Some Community Groups have
Influential “Inputs”

Unrepresentative
School Board

Apolitical
Superintendent
Turnover

Personal Apolitical
Reasons by the
Superintendent

School Board Decides
(creates “Outputs”)

Superintendent
Turnover due to
internal
Board/Director
Disagreement
Disagreement with
Internal
Organizational
Decisions

Figure 1. Causes for Superintendent Turnover Based on Three Theoretical Constructs.
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Problem Statement
Reischauer’s (1973) assertion, “we need a profound reshaping of education if
mankind is to survive in the sort of world that is fast evolving” (p. 3) still holds true
today. Arguably, continuity in the superintendent position may contribute to the
“profound reshaping of education” that Reischauer predicted. Unfortunately, according to
Kowalski et al. (2010), the superintendency has become a job so daunting that
superintendent tenure is on the decline. Because superintendent turnover is thought to
negatively influence school performance (Alsbury, 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2015; Chingos et
al., 2014), one pressing question is what are the factors that lead to superintendent
turnover? There has been much speculation about superintendent tenure and turnover;
however, very little current quantitative research exists detailing the characteristics of
superintendent tenure (Alsbury, 2003, 2008b; Chingos et al., 2014).
Turnover in the top administrative position in any organizational structure is a
phenomenon that can be disruptive, whether it is planned, self-imposed, or imposed on
the incumbent (Alsbury, 2003, 2008b). Few studies indicate the reasons for
superintendent turnover but include obtaining a more lucrative or desirable position, poor
board relations, and faulty management decisions as reported reasons (Alsbury, 2003,
2008b). The problem is that studies on the effects of turnover in the top administrative
positions within school districts in international schools focused on the reasons for
superintendent turnover are limited (Moos & Paulsen, 2014) and none explicitly measure
the influence of board/director relationship on tenure.
This study focused on the presence of a significant relationship between the
relationship of the school board and director on director tenure. In addition, age, gender,
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race, highest degree achieved, and tenure in their previous position were analyzed for a
significant relationship to director tenure.
Purpose and Research Questions
The purpose of this study was to examine the self-reported causes of turnover of
international school directors. Specifically, this study examined whether the relationships
between the school board and the international school director is linked to tenure of the
international director in their previous position.
Data was gathered through a questionnaire including director gender, race, age,
highest degree achieved, and tenure in their previous position of international school
directors. Each respondent who completed the questionnaire was asked to write
explaining why they left their last position. The data were analyzed to determine whether
the relationship between the school board and the international school director is linked
to the tenure in their previous position – moreover, whether other factors including age,
gender race, highest degree achieved, are also linked to tenure in their previous position.
Research questions. Specifically, this study investigated the following questions:
1. What factors influence the turnover of international school directors?
2. Does relationship between school board members and international school
directors correlate to length of tenure?
3. Is there a significant relationship between the age, gender, race, highest degree
achieved, and tenure in their previous position?
Methods and analysis. A questionnaire (see Appendix A) was sent to 300
international school directors. The data collected included: age, gender, race, highest
degree achieved, and tenure in their previous position, along with open ended questions,
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and a question that asked specifically about the school board and superintendent
relationship in the previous position.
This study collected self-reported perceived factors influencing the turnover of
international school directors. The study examined whether school director/school board
relationship influences director tenure in the previous position. The questionnaire
(Appendix A) has demographic information as well as short answer responses that
determine if relationship is a factor in director turnover. The follow-up question to the
open-ended question (question 14) in the questionnaire provided information regarding
the director and school board relationship.
Spearman’s rank-order correlation was run as a method of analysis. The third
research question was analyzed and assessed using Spearman’s rho, a point-biserial
correlation and a one-way ANOVA.
Glossary of terms.
Superintendent of Schools: the chief school officer of a school organization.
School Director: synonymous to superintendent of schools in the international
school community.
School Board: an elected council that helps determine educational policy in a
small, city- or county-sized region (example: Seattle School Board oversees educational
policy for the Seattle School District).
School Board Turnover: the number of times a school board member is replaced
during a period of time (i.e., could be through elections and voter dissatisfaction; election
to higher office or relocation of the elected official; or in some cases forced to resign
from office).
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Superintendent Turnover: the number of times a superintendent is replaced during
a period of time.
Superintendent/School Board Relationship: the school board is the
superintendent’s statutory employer and supervisor, and the two parties work together to
co-create policy for the school district.
Significance of Study
The practical significance of the study is two-fold. First, the study attempted to
raise awareness about the consequences of turnover to school districts so that proper
planning for a successor may begin. Second, it attempted to determine what leads to the
turnover of international school directors and if relationship to the school board is a
contributing factor. The school board should be aware that a change in the top
administrator, either voluntary or demanded by the board, may have consequences on the
organization. The school board must consider the effects of director turnover on
employee morale, negative public relations, and even the potential divisive infighting
between upper administrators, as well as the occurrence of politics and strained relations
among board members. All of these may have a lasting effect on the immediate and longterm future of the school district. A practical outcome of this study may contribute to
improved administrative and institutional practices so as to prevent, to the extent
possible, predictable and unnecessary turnover, and assist with the very practical
management mechanism of a succession plan.
This particular study will not likely provide findings leading to theoretical
significance regarding superintendent turnover theory. In regards to a substantive
significance, only one other international school director turnover study exists, (Moos &
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Paulsen, 2014) which covered the Nordic region of Europe; therefore, this particular
study would add to the research of international school director turnover. Furthermore, a
key variable of elected versus appointed boards will be asked in the questionnaire and
this could support the relevancy of the Dissatisfaction Theory beyond the U.S., for
elected boards, based on the findings.
Summary
This study is organized into five chapters along with cited references, the blank
questionnaire and relevant appendices. The first chapter is the overview of the research
project. It includes an introduction, problem statement, purpose, significance, glossary of
terms and a summary. The second chapter is a current review of the literature regarding
superintendent turnover and the causes for such turnover. The third chapter explains the
research methodology, research questions, procedures, the null hypotheses, and the
analysis methods. The third chapter also describes the scope and limitations of the study,
population and sample, survey instrument and the data collection procedures and a
summary. The fourth chapter presents the findings along with the analysis of the data and
its interpretation, based upon quantitative testing and qualitative inquiry. Furthermore, it
reports the analysis using Spearman’s rho, point-biserial correlation, and a one-way
ANOVA. The fifth and last chapter provides summaries, implications (both practical and
theoretical), future study recommendations and conclusions.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Causes of Superintendent Turnover: An Examination of the Research
This issue of superintendent turnover is not limited to one section of the country
(Cooper et al., 2000; Grady & Bryant, 1991; Hosman, 1990; Metzger, 1997) or to rural
school districts (Eaton & Sharp, 1996; Grady & Bryant, 1991) or to urban school districts
(Cooper et al., 2000; Kowalski, 1999; Yee & Cuban, 1996).
The position of school superintendent is one of the more difficult, complicated
jobs in the educational profession (Chingos et al., 2014; Kowalski, 1999; Metzger, 1997;
Waters & Marzano, 2007), because most, if not all, decisions and meetings are open to
the community which subject the superintendent to public scrutiny and ridicule,
especially during times of taxpayer revolt. Citizens with political aspirations, declared
change agents, and sometimes disgruntled voters and taxpayers who often run for board
of education seats (Alsbury, 2003; Natkin et al., 2002), could put the superintendent at
odds with newly-elected board members (Alsbury, 2003). The superintendent of schools
must publicly juggle a number of conflicting variables that sometimes lead to disputes
with incumbent school board members (Carter & Cunningham, 1997; Cuban, 1998;
Iannaccone & Lutz, 1994). Some of these disputes have been traced back to a series of
school reforms, generally started after the National Commission on Excellence in
Education’s report (Gardner et al., 1983) A Nation at Risk warned that the United States’
educational system was inadequate, while not appropriately teaching the nation’s youth.
Farrar (1990) argued that these reforms came in three waves: the first, focused on
improving student performance; the second, focused on upgrading teacher certification,
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pay and working conditions; the third, focused on the preparation of school
administrators. It is this third school reform effort that has become most contentious for
the school superintendent.
Due to deteriorating resources and an increased demand for more and better
educational outcomes, the tension between the school board and the superintendent has
become more volatile (Kowalski, 1999). Giles and Giles (1990) found that over a sixyear period in California, a staggering 75% of superintendent turnover was attributable to
disharmonious board relations.
Danzberger and Usdan (1994) argued that the present system of a school board
carrying out local educational practices through delegated state authority has changed
very little since the early 20th century. Educational reformers have agreed that meaningful
educational change is more likely to be successful when pursued at the local school board
level, which is generally supported by the community and the professional educators,
including the superintendents (Kowalski, 1999). Seemingly, however, these good
educational policies and reforms are at the success or failure of the relationship held
between the board of education and the superintendent. Blumberg (1985) noted that:
It is not surprising that superintendents have tended to think of the school board in
terms of individual members rather than as a group. Both the superintendent’s
professional reputation and his personal welfare depend greatly on his ability to
influence its decisions. Further, it is primarily through the one-on-one linkage
between superintendent and school board member that attempts to influence take
place. There is nothing underhanded about this. It is an accepted and legitimate
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part of the workings of our political institutions--and lest there by any
misunderstandings, school boards definitely are political institutions. (pp. 76-77)
Therefore, the superintendent’s relationship with the board is critical, not just for
educating the district’s students, but also for job security of the superintendent (Sharp,
1994). Cuban (1988) stated that “…the central image [of a superintendent] is negotiatorstatesman which is one of politics” (p. 116). Since superintendents must attempt to
establish positive relationships with all board members, Kowalski (1999) warned that
even positive relations cultivated over several years may be ruined by “a misconstrued
comment, the failure to accommodate the request for a favor, or the unwillingness to
support a particular position on a controversial policy matter” (p. 45). Inevitably, the
superintendent and the school board are always in an uneasy conflict with one another
(Blumberg, 1985; Carter & Cunningham, 1997; Chance & Capps, 1990, 1992; Kowalski,
1999; Sharp & Walter, 2003).
Since this relationship is political, the superintendent’s trustfulness and honesty
come into play (Achilles, 1997; Blumberg, 1985; Dlugosh, 1997; Fullan, 2002; Hoyle et
al., 2005). Bennis (1989) suggested successful leaders, regardless of what profession or
where they are in an organizational hierarchy, need to have the competency he calls
“management of trust.” This ability grows from the leader’s capacity to be reliable and
constant, which builds a record of support of issues when there are competing factions
and pressures upon the leader. In other words, the person making the decision has the
confidence and the support of the people for whom he or she is making the decision
(Dlugosh, 1997). Even if a number of people publicly disagree with the superintendent of
schools over some emotional problem, such as the promotion of a bond issue or an
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increase in school taxes, there is a tendency to respect the honesty of the superintendent.
When a superintendent is honest, forthright, and assertive, the board of education tends to
inspire trust with the superintendent and helps to build his or her credibility. Blumberg
(1985) stated that “the lack of those two ingredients to the relationship--trust and
credibility--makes for an untenable situation” (p. 81). Eventually this type of
circumstance will lead to the superintendent being replaced (Lutz & Iannaccone, 1986).
However, there are a number of other reasons why superintendents leave their
positions than just board/superintendent relations. Dlugosh (1994), in a study of
contributing factors of turnover of school administrators in Nebraska, found that
administrators wanted to acquire “better” positions (with usually greater financial reward
or higher status in the profession, such as movement to a larger district), or they wanted
to move to a larger community. A few superintendents left because of family pressures,
stress, working conditions and school board relations.
Major Studies Supporting the Study
For at least five decades, researchers have been interested in the question of why
superintendents leave their school districts (see Iannaccone & Lutz, 1970). Though the
question has been recurrent in the literature over this time period, most data used to
address it have come from case studies, interviews, and small-scale surveys which may
not be representative of the nation as a whole. However, a few national studies have used
quantitative methods measuring superintendent turnover. These include the Natkin et al.
study (2002); the American Association of School Superintendents surveys (Glass, Bjork,
& Brunner, 2000; Kowalski et al., 2010); and the Alsbury studies (2003; 2008b).
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Natkin, Cooper, Alborano, Padilla and Ghosh Study. Natkin et al. (2002)
provided a quantitative study on survival of the superintendency. The study included two
distinct sets of public school districts: (a) all those in North Carolina (n = 117), and (b) a
national random sample of school districts provided by the American Association of
School Administrators (n = 462). These were used to check for validity; then merged into
one larger dataset for analysis.
These researchers found that superintendent tenure averaged six to seven years,
regardless of the district’s size or location. Factors significantly related to
superintendents’ longevity in office were the extent of school board involvement in
management, support for needed construction, and consolidation of school systems,
district poverty level, and superintendent’s post-graduate education. The research
indicated that superintendent tenure had not markedly increased since 1975, and that
superintendent turnover was not as serious an issue as sometimes portrayed by news
media. Despite this result, Natkin et al. revealed that, when combined, the factors of high
poverty of students enrolled in the district, minimal support for construction of new
facilities, and micromanagement by school governance, lead to shorter tenure.
In their study, Natkin et al. (2002) sought to determine median superintendent
tenure, the relationship between tenure and district demographics, activities of the school
board and their effect on superintendent tenure, and the effect of the superintendent’s
level of education on his/her tenure. An instrument entitled Superintendent Longevity and
Time Study (SLATS) was developed for the study. The researchers had a return rate of
81% (95 out of 117) from North Carolina districts and 42.6% (197 out of 462) from the
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national sample. Each school district provided feedback on one or more superintendents,
all of which was factored into the study’s 892 cases.
While this study did not specifically ask about the relationship between the school
board and the superintendent when researching on superintendent turnover, the study
found high levels of poverty, minimal support in regards to new facilities, and micromanagement to be reasons for shorter tenure. This supports the Decision Output Theory
(Wirt & Kirst, 2005) with regards to the statement: “governance of local school boards is
affected by the limitations of economic and personnel resources in local school districts.”
These factors all describe what one can infer to be a relationship strained because the
demands placed on the superintendent were not met, which therefore caused friction in
the relationship between the school board and the superintendent.
American Association of School Superintendents Surveys. Since 1923, the
American Association of School Administrators (AASA) has conducted nationwide
surveys of district superintendents. Every 10 years, thousands of superintendents are
surveyed in an effort to provide a national perspective on the roles and responsibilities
associated with the district superintendency. The two most recent surveys have shown
that demographics such as race, age, and gender for the position of superintendent have
not experienced much change over the last decade (Glass et al., 2000; Kowalski et al.,
2010). One of the most comprehensive studies about superintendent characteristics is the
Glass et al. study of the American school superintendent. In this 2000 study, Glass and
his colleagues examined and analyzed superintendent demographics such as age, gender,
and ethnicity from a historical perspective. The researchers determined that there were
12,604 “regular public school districts” (Glass et al., 2000, p. 10), and of that population
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a random sample of 5,336 superintendents were chosen to participate in the study. The
survey instrument for the 2000 study was developed by AASA staff and the researchers.
Items from the 1992 study were largely reused for the 2000 study, and items from the
1982 study were used to develop the 1992 survey instrument. The use of previous 10year study survey items were incorporated to provide comparative data.
The survey was mailed to the participants with a 42.4% (2,262) rate of return.
Data from the returned surveys was analyzed using Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (SPSS) software and was disaggregated by total response group, enrollment
strata, gender, and minority categories. Both simple percentage and cross-tabulation were
used to present the findings. These are the only two methods of data analysis mentioned.
Researchers surveyed 2,262 superintendents and reported findings that did not
differ dramatically from previous decennial studies. The average age for superintendents
was reported to have been 52 and the vast majority of superintendents continued to be
Caucasian males. It was noted that the median age of superintendents had increased to 52,
indicating that individuals were accessing the position later in life. This increase in the
median age was even more notable when compared to the median age of 43, which was
reported in 1923 during a time when most school districts were rural and consisted of
only a handful of schools. The most recent and comprehensive AASA study, published in
2010, surveyed just under 1,900 superintendents across the nation and provided similar
findings to Glass et al. (2000) in regards to age, gender, and race (Kowalski et al., 2010).
The reported median age of superintendents increased slightly from 52 in 2000 to the age
of 56 in 2010 (Kowalski et al., 2010). Data regarding female superintendents in the 2010
study indicated 24.1% of women held the position, which was substantially higher than
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the 13.2% reported by Glass et al. in 2000. In 2010, it was shown again that women were
older when accessing the position and had more teaching and administrative experience
than males, prior to becoming superintendents. Additionally, Kowalski et al. (2010)
found that non-minority respondents were twice as likely to enter the position before the
age of 46, whereas their minority peers were accessing the position later in life and less
than 6% of superintendents nationwide were from an ethnic minority. Demographic data
is relevant in looking at superintendent turnover because there is a higher chance that a
minority would be placed (Kowalski et al., 2010) in an urban district, rather than a
minority superintendent in rural America. Practically, whether or not a minority should
enter the job of superintendent in an urban district with statistically high turnover makes
it extremely relevant for job seekers.
The Kowalski et al. (2010) study findings were most relevant to the thesis of this
paper because it measured a significant difference between average tenure for urban
superintendents and other superintendents. In a larger urban district, superintendents
would not typically be leaving due to moving up to higher paying larger district;
therefore, their departure would more likely be due to board turnover or a relationship
problem. Moreover, in looking at the data presented, board turnover typically occurred
during an election cycle (which is typically four years) and the average superintendent
tenure was less than three years (Kowalski et al., 2010), thus suggesting the reason for the
turnover was not due to board turnover, but rather suggested a relationship strain between
the board and the superintendent. While an argument could be made that the urban versus
non-urban tenure difference is likely a result of a relationship breakdown, Kowalski et
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al.’s study did not identify reasons for this difference, including whether the school board
and superintendent relationship was a cause for superintendent turnover.
This study supported the Decision Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005), because
historically, urban superintendents have experienced shorter tenure than other
superintendents (Kowalski et al., 2010); and due to the fact that the role of the
superintendent is so diverse for various reasons, geography and size being only two;
tenure varies. Again, the Decision Output Theory speaks to local governance not having
resources to support a myriad of initiatives, thus creating turnover of the superintendent
(Wirt & Kirst, 2005). As mentioned above, the average tenure of an urban superintendent
was less than three years, suggesting that the relationship between the board and the
superintendent plays a critical part in the retention of the superintendent. Furthermore,
large urban districts typically are what superintendents of smaller districts aspire to
(Glass et al., 2000); so personal reasons to leave (i.e., Continuous Participation Theory) is
not relevant. Finally, though urban districts do have several competing politics, and board
turnover may be high (i.e., Dissatisfaction Theory), there are still elections that take place
and the average turnover in urban districts occurs faster than the overall mean turnover
rate. By eliminating both the Dissatisfaction Theory and the Continuous Participation
Theory, the 2010 Kowalski et al. study pointed more to the school board and
superintendent relationship as a possible cause for turnover (i.e., Decision-Output
Theory).
Alsbury studies. Alsbury (2003 and 2008b) studied political versus apolitical
turnover as a critical variable in the application of the Dissatisfaction Theory (Iannaccone
& Lutz, 1970). In particular, he reported detailed analysis of a so-called “deviant case,” a
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rural school district in Washington State that initially appeared not to support the
Dissatisfaction Theory (Iannaccone & Lutz, 1970)— for despite frequent school board
turnover, there was no consequent superintendent turnover.
This study used qualitative and quantitative research methods in each of two
phases in the project. In the first phase of the study, correlational design was used to
collect and analyze data state-wide on superintendent and school board member turnover.
In the second phase, the study investigated the existence of a statistically significant
relationship between school board member and superintendent turnover, delineating
between all school board turnover and politically motivated turnover and defeat. The
study described the district as changing over the course of 20 years (1980-2000) due to
changes in the community and economy. The Dissatisfaction Theory (Iannaccone &
Lutz, 1970) would suggest that an increase in incumbent defeat indicates community
dissatisfaction with the existing school board and its values; however, Alsbury (2003)
noted in his findings that superintendent Dr. Miller (a pseudonym to protect anonymity):
…stepped away from direct board meeting control and allowed the board
president to handle the conflict thus divesting power from himself and providing
protection in case this antagonist had, indeed, eventually won support from other
new board members…. This protective savvy, not detectable through quantitative
measures, contributed to Dr. Miller’s staying in the district. (p .692)
Alsbury (2008b) reported school districts in Washington had a high rate of school
board member change (97%) during the 1993-2000 time frame. Superintendent turnover
also was high (72%). Out of the 176 school districts who returned surveys, only five had
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no school board member changes during the study period 1993-2000, while 46 districts
had no superintendent turnover.
The Chi-square Test for Independence and the Bonferroni t statistic were used to
analyze the data collected for the study. Of the 18 Chi-square tests performed, four tests
showed a statistically significant relationship between incumbent school board member
and superintendent turnover at an alpha level of .05. However, after using a new alpha
level of .033 established with the Bonferroni t formula, only one test remained
statistically significant.
The strongest relationship between school board member and superintendent
turnover occurred four years after the 1995 election. Delineation between school board
member defeat and turnover did not yield noticeable differences in the findings, although
the one statistically significant correlation came from data comparing school board
member defeat, with no significant relational results from the non-defeat data.
With little quantitative data to support the Dissatisfaction Theory, qualitative data
were evaluated in Phase II of the study in hope of providing additional and more in-depth
information. In this phase of the study, two districts, whose resulting quantitative data did
not provide support for a significant link between school board member and
superintendent turnover, were visited for 2 – 3 days. Data was collected through
interviews of superintendents, principals, school board members and other district
personnel, as well as an evaluation of the board minutes and other supporting
documentation. Qualitative data supported the use of the Dissatisfaction Theory in these
districts as a useful tool to explain the political chain of events wherein quantitative data
could not demonstrate a relationship.
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Relevance to the current study. Two of the studies did support the Decision
Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005); from which it then can be inferred that there was a
strain in the relationship, thus supporting the thesis. Some studies, for example Alsbury
(2003), used a postcard to ask about superintendent turnover: political vs. apolitical; and
one question alluded to the relationship between the superintendent and school board by
stating “conflict with other board members” as a reason for leaving that superintendent
post (Alsbury, 2003, p. 676). However, the vagueness of the survey question left further
speculation on whether the relationship was severed; if there was conflict amongst board
members’ viewpoints and not necessarily against the superintendent; or whether the
relationship was severed due to turnover in school boards, rather than existing board
members, which is a small, yet distinct significance in the reason for superintendent
turnover.
Other research. A considerable number of studies involve interviewing members
of major stakeholder groups, such as school board members, retired superintendents, or
community leaders, and asking about reasons for superintendents leaving their positions
(Grady & Bryant, 1991; Metzger, 1997). The interview findings are usually grouped by
common features, resulting in lists of items cited as contributing to turnover, such as:
board member interference in management; conflicts with staff; cultural clashes between
board members and superintendents hired from outside the district; sports-related
conflicts, and many others. Other studies have identified the stresses of difficult working
conditions—including school board disharmony, the pressures of accountability, and the
increasing complexity that accompanies changing student demographics—as reducing
many superintendents’ job tenures (e.g., McCurdy & Hymes, 1992).
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In 2003, the Council of Great City Schools (CGCS) reported results of a survey
conducted with member districts. Average tenure for urban superintendents was reported
to be only 2.75 years (up from 2.5 in 2001), but mean tenure for the immediate past
CGCS superintendents averaged over four years. Supporting CGCS findings, the Council
of Urban Board of Education (CUBE) reported the tenure of urban superintendents
between four and five years (National School Boards Association, 2001).
A more direct line of survey questions that help the researcher identify the root
cause of superintendent turnover—directly linking the relationship between the school
board and superintendent and a reason for moving to another district—would help answer
the thesis question. Furthermore, specific research questions asked in a qualitative study
as a follow-up to those superintendents who did in fact leave due to strained relationships
between the board and superintendent would help answer questions posed in this paper.
Theoretical Frameworks in Previous Studies
The deficiencies in this literature are also theoretical. Much of the early work that
addressed superintendent turnover was rooted in Dissatisfaction Theory (Iannaccone &
Lutz, 1970). This theory suggests that districts experience long stable periods of school
board membership during which community dissatisfaction with district performance
gradually builds until reaching a tipping point, at which time school board members are
thrown out of office and their successors replace the superintendent, completing a new
regime (Grissom, 2010; Hosman, 1990; Iannaccone & Lutz, 1970; Weninger & Stout,
1989).
Dissatisfaction Theory yields one prediction about superintendent turnover: that
politically motivated school board turnover will lead to higher rates of turnover among
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superintendents. But what about turnover during times of school board stability, a
phenomenon that casual observation suggests is frequent but about which Dissatisfaction
Theory is silent?
Existing literature on superintendent turnover offers little theoretical leverage on
this important question. Seemingly, superintendents leave their posts for many reasons
other than termination by a newly elected school board. For example, in one survey of
superintendents who had changed districts, four times as many respondents listed their
reason for leaving as an opportunity to move to a larger district than those who said that
the move was due to “changing board/elections” (Glass et al., 2000, p. 89). This
suggested that career advancement is a more important factor for superintendent turnover
than are the regime changes Dissatisfaction Theory predicts. Other studies have identified
the stresses of difficult working conditions—including school board disharmony, the
pressures of accountability, and the increasing complexity that accompanies changing
student demographics—as reducing many superintendents’ job tenures (e.g., McCurdy &
Hymes, 1992). To more fully conceptualize superintendent turnover, a broader
framework is needed that can incorporate involuntary turnover that dissatisfied
communities may demand along with voluntary turnover that superintendents seeking
more prestigious positions or better working conditions may create.
Studies that have used larger data sets typically have not employed multivariate
methods that allow them to rule out alternative explanations for the associations they
uncover. The result is a research base that is much leaner than those examining other
types of turnover in education (e.g., Guarino, Santibanez, & Daley, 2006). Researchers
have noted the need for studies of superintendent turnover using recent data that allow
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consideration of the roles and relationships of superintendents and school boards in the
age of complex accountability systems and changing student demographic trends
(Fusarelli et al., 2010; Petersen & Fusarelli, 2005).
Another example, Yee and Cuban (1996) published quantitative studies that
addressed superintendent turnover that have mainly been descriptive in nature, simply
presenting tenure statistics for one or more time periods. Perhaps the earliest study to
indicate that tenure in urban districts significantly exceeds two and a-half years was
conducted by Yee and Cuban (1996), who presented virtually complete tenure statistics
for superintendents of the nation’s 25 largest districts for a period covering the entire 20th
century. They analyzed district records of complete tenure for superintendents who were
in office at the beginning of every decade. Yee and Cuban’s data were completed from
1980 and nearly through 1990, allowing them to draw an accurate historical picture of
tenure in these largest districts.
Superintendent and School Board Relationships: A Factor of Superintendent
Turnover
While instructional leadership is integral to the role of superintendent, the
increasingly complex political aspects of the job must be handled as well (Education
Writers Association, n.d.; Hoyle et al., 2005). Superintendent relationships with school
boards were found to be a decisive element of superintendent tenure (Education Writers
Association, n.d.). Conflict with the school board is often cited as a common reason for
superintendents leaving a district, hence their attrition (Rausch, 2001). Allen (1998)
observed that superintendents listed the relationship with the board as a second reason for
involuntary non-extension of a contract, while board members listed relationships with
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the superintendent as the major cause. Despite conflicts, Glass and co-researchers (2000)
surmised that the school board and superintendent must work together to connect the
school district with the needs of the community (Goodman & Zimmerman, 2000).
While many school boards and superintendents described having mutually
cooperative relationships, Farkas, Johnson, Duffett, and Foleno (2001) reported that 65%
of superintendents speculated that many school boards simply wanted leaders the board
could control. Furthermore, over 80% of superintendents have reported feeling frustrated
with politics and bureaucracy of the job (Farkas, Johnson, & Duffett, 2003; Farkas et al.,
2001). A primary source of frustration, from a superintendent’s perspective, stemmed
from school boards micromanaging or interfering in superintendents’ administrative
responsibilities (Harvey, 2003); with more than two-thirds of superintendents stating that
their board meddled in issues not within the scope of its responsibility. According to
Goodman and Zimmerman (2000), a quality working relationship between effective
leaders and school boards is a “key cornerstone of the foundation for high student
achievement” (p. 1). As local school boards are the sole evaluators of superintendent
performance and renewal of contracts, a quality working relationship with members
directly influences the tenure of the superintendent.
Furthermore, the relationship between the superintendent and the school board
that supervises him or her is a central aspect of the superintendency. The school board is
the superintendent’s statutory employer and supervisor, and the two parties work together
to co-create policy for the school district. Therefore, in case-based studies of
superintendent turnover, difficulties related to working with board members are typically
the most frequently identified contributors (Parker, 1996; Richardson, 1998; Tallerico &
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Burstyn, 1996). These difficulties have included conflict between the superintendent and
board and the challenges of working with a board whose members cannot cooperate with
one another, which are often related (Grissom, 2010; Mountford, 2008). Reasons cited for
poor relationships between superintendents and their school boards have included role
confusion, tendencies among some board members to micromanage, and incompatible
approaches to decision-making (Danzberger, Kirst, & Usdan, 1992; Kowalski, 1999;
McCurdy & Hymes, 1992; Mountford, 2008).
Despite evidence that positive board-superintendent relationships are the norm
rather than the exception (Glass et al., 2000), findings from surveys of superintendents
have supported the conclusion from qualitative studies that conflict with the school board
is often an important factor in a superintendent’s exit. In surveys of superintendents who
had left positions in Nebraska and South Carolina by Grady and Bryant (1991) and
Monteith and Hallums (1989), respectively, board conflict or interference was cited by
more than half of respondents as a contributor to their departure (Grissom, 2010). In
Eaton and Sharp’s (1996) survey of superintendents which asked why their predecessor
left the district, board relationship conflict was identified as a similarly large factor.
Though not articulated in these studies, it is important to emphasize that conflict between
board members and a strained relationship between the board and the superintendent can
influence both the superintendent’s decision to stay or go and the board’s decision to
retain the superintendent or not.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
The purpose of this study was to examine the self-reported causes of turnover of
international school directors. Specifically, this study examined whether the relationships
between the school board and the international school director is linked to international
school director tenure in their previous position.
This study combined quantitative and qualitative research methods. A
questionnaire (see Appendix A) was distributed to a sample of international school
directors (both for profit and non-profit). They were asked to answer specific
demographic questions about themselves and the history of board and superintendent
tenure in their previous position. The data collected included: age, gender, race, highest
degree achieved, and tenure in their previous position, along with an open ended question
and a question that asks specifically about the school board and superintendent
relationship in the previous position.
Research Questions
Specifically, this study investigated the following questions:
1. What factors influence the turnover of international school directors?
2. Does relationship between school board members and international school
directors correlate to length of tenure?
3. Is there a significant relationship between the age, gender, race, highest degree
achieved, and tenure in their previous position?
Null Hypotheses In examining the second research question, does relationship
between school board members and international school directors correlate to director
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turnover; anecdotal experience indicated the relationship between the school board and
director will impact turnover. Furthermore, if the relationship between the school board
and director is poor, it is predicted that the director is likely to report they left their
position within a four year margin – three years is the typical initial contract of an
international school director (as indicated on the questionnaire – Appendix A).
In examining the first research question, it is expected that a key factor
influencing turnover will be the relationship between the international school director and
the school board, as described in the Decision Output Theory; therefore, the hypothesis
for the second research question is:
1. International school director tenure in the previous position is significantly
related to the self-reported relationship between the school board and the
international school director.
In examining the third research question, the following null hypotheses are
measured:
1. International school director gender is not significantly related to tenure in
their previous position.
2. International school director race is not significantly related to tenure in their
previous position.
3. International school director highest degree earned is not significantly related
to tenure in their previous position.
4. International school director age is not significantly related to tenure in their
previous position.
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Analysis
Questionnaire. The questionnaire included open-ended questions about reasons
leaving their most recent position. The open-ended questions are listed below.
1. Please describe your reason for leaving your previous position.
2. Please add any additional information regarding your previous turnover and
the relationship with the board.
The reported reasons for turnover were analyzed to determine a significant
relationship between a number of demographic characteristics and director turnover
influenced by negative director/school board relationship. Previous research has indicated
a variety of self-reported reasons for superintendent turnover: retiring; promoted to a new
job; and conflict with school board (Alsbury 2003, 2008b; Glass et al., 2000; Kowalski et
al., 2010). Each of the reasons for turnover reported by respondents in the open-ended
question (question #13, Appendix B) were analyzed using an emergent theme method.
Concepts (explanatory ideas) were identified from the data in the first stages of analysis
and given a label or code that describes them. Concepts which are closely linked in
meaning can be formed into categories; and categories which have similar meanings can
be brought together into a theme (Field, 2013).
When an answer was coded “Board” (i.e., director/school board relationship
influenced turnover), it meant that at some point in their answer to question 13 the
respondent indicated that a negative or strained relationship was a factor in their turnover.
If a respondent mentioned “relationship,” then it was coded as “Board.” If respondents
put multiple reasons for turnover, then all mentioned reasons were counted. An artifact of
this method of counting the responses is that the percentages of responses totaled more
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than 100%; but it avoided artificially inflating one category relative to the rest of them.
Furthermore, the relationship between the school board and superintendent was
directly asked in question 14 using a five-point Likert scale. The questionnaire item
reads: Rate your relationship with your school board on the following Likert scale
(choose one). The scale is as follows: Very Good Relationship; Good Relationship;
Neutral; Poor Relationship and Very Poor Relationship. The researcher cross-referenced
question 14 with questions 13 and 15 for a deeper view of the association between
relationship with board and turnover.
Open-ended questions 13 and 15 were used because these were potentially
sensitive questions and respondents may have been reluctant to write that relationship is
an issue; so they could include a variety of answers to describe the reason for turnover.
However, any indication that a negative or strained relationship was a reason for turnover
in their open-ended response was coded as relationship with board, and then was cross
referenced with how they answered question 14 and their perception of the relationship
based on the five-point Likert scale.
Variables. In order to determine which analysis methods to utilize, the researcher
identified the variety of variables: age, gender, race, highest degree achieved, length of
tenure in the previous position, quality of relationship with the board of directors/board of
education, and reason for leaving the previous position.
Gender was defined as a dichotomous nominal variable with only two categories
for this study (Field, 2013). Despite the recent developments regarding gender as perhaps
being a multinomial variable (nominal variables with three or more categories; Field,
2013) gender is defined as male or female in this study.
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Age is sometimes measured as a continuous variable, but this questionnaire asked
respondents to select the age range that described them: 20 – 29, 30 – 39, 40 – 49, 50 –
59, 60 – 69, or 70+. From this was derived an ordinal variable for age range.
Highest degree achieved was measured as an ordinal variable in this study (Field,
2013). Ordinal variables are ranked, for example highest degree achieved is ranked 1 –
Bachelor’s Degree; 2 – Master’s Degree and so forth.
Race/ethnicity was defined as a nominal variable. Nominal variables have three or
more categories that do not have an intrinsic order (Field, 2013); in other words, they
cannot be ranked.
Tenure in the previous position is a quasi-continuous variable, measured in years.
This was captured in question 12 on the questionnaire.
For this study, the quality of the “relationship between the international school
director and the school board” was measured as ordinal categorical variable (Field, 2013).
The quality of relationship variable was categorized from answers to questions 13, 14,
and 15. Question 13 was an open-ended question in the questionnaire that read: Please
describe your reason for leaving your previous position. Using an emergent theme
method, five categories emerged—Board, Contract, Environmental, Opportunity, and
Retirement—into which the responses were sorted, resulting in a nominal variable. In a
few cases, responses were ambiguous or indicated multiple reasons for leaving, and the
researcher examined the responses to question 14 (about quality of relationship with the
board, on a 5-point Likert scale—see Appendix A) and question 15 (an open-ended
question: Please add any additional information regarding your previous turnover and
the relationship with the board) to determine categorization. For example, for case #7,
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the answer to question 13 was “Personal, wanted a new country and didn’t like the
direction we were going,” which could be characterized as “Environmental” or “Board;”
so the researcher examined the responses to questions 14 and 15. The case #7 response to
question 14 was “Very Poor Relationship” with the board; and the question 15 response
was “Board didn’t listen to my advice. It was time for change. They wanted a manager
and not a leader.” Taking the three responses together, the researcher categorized case #7
as both “Board” and “Environmental” for the “reason for leaving” variable.
Methods. Initially, an ordinal logistic regression was considered as a method
because the dependent variable is an ordinal dependent variable and multiple independent
variables are categorical. This test would assess the relationship between each
independent variable and the dependent variable taking into consideration all independent
variables in the study. More specifically, it could determine which, if any, of the
independent variables have a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable. In
order to run an ordinal logistic regression, there are two assumptions that need to be
considered. These assumptions are: assumption one, you have one dependent variable
that is measured at the ordinal level (see question 14, Appendix A); and assumption two,
you have one or more independent variables that are continuous. Furthermore, in ordinal
logistical regression, a test for multicollinearity, which occurs when you have two or
more independent variables that are highly correlated with each other, will need to be run.
After more consideration and consultation, the researcher considered Spearman’s Rho as
an analysis method to investigate the correlation between length of international school
director tenure and quality of relationship with the school board. Spearman’s rho requires
three assumptions (Laerd, 2015). First, one must have two variables that are continuous
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and/or ordinal. The variables used for this analysis were length of tenure, as a ratio
variable; and quality of relationship with the board. Second, the two variables must
represent paired observations—that is, for each answer to question 12, there is a
corresponding answer to question 14. Third, there must be a monotonic relationship
between the two variables—in other words, as the tenure variable increases, the
relationship variable consistently increases or decreases.
Population and sample. This study surveyed approximately 300 international
school directors from a variety of geographical regions: South America, Europe, Africa,
Asia, and Southeast Asia. A directory was available that enabled exporting of listed
emails to Excel spreadsheet software. Schools without published email contacts were
excluded from this study. International school directors were contacted from varying size
schools from all over the world. The study was not limited to one country in particular, so
a strong cross-section of global educators can be used in selecting the participants. Due to
the researcher having been currently employed in Kuwait as an international school
director and having received the online questionnaire himself, the researcher did not fill
out the questionnaire.
Survey instrument. This study used a questionnaire to investigate the perceived
reasons of international directors for director turnover. These different and/or similar
reasons for turnover, along with the demographic characteristics of the surveyed
administrators, were statistically analyzed using Spearman’s rho, a point-biserial
correlation and a one-way ANOVA in SPSS. The questionnaire was distributed
electronically to international school directors worldwide.
Data collection procedures. Questionnaire returns were expected to be
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approximately 100 international school directors; however, the actual return exceeded
that amount and will be discussed in chapter four. The researcher used an updated
directory list in January 2017 from the group list called HeadNet. All the directors, which
are approximately 300, were selected from this directory and invited to complete the
questionnaire. The list was maintained in an Excel spreadsheet and broken out by the size
of school. The size of school was broken out into three categories, as on the questionnaire
(Appendix A); small size are schools containing students 500 or less; medium size
schools continue 501-1500 students, and large schools contain more than 1,501 students.
There was a potential of over 300 questionnaires to be returned if 100% of the
international school directors return the questionnaire in completion. The questionnaire
was sent to international school directors using an American curriculum, therefore, no
translation was required and questionnaire results were all reported in English. Next, each
administrator received an introductory email from the investigator with a brief
description of the study, the researcher, and instructions on how to access the web based
questionnaire. The email explained that the questionnaire itself was voluntary, and the
anonymity of the participants will be protected.
Response rates for questionnaires tend to be low in general (Fowler, 2013). The
advantages to this online format are low cost, potential for high speed of returns, and
potential for thoughtful and accurate responses. The disadvantages are potential email
spam filtering that limits the realized sample size, and the limited cooperation of busy
administrators that may impact the response rate.
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Summary
Chapter three described the research questions and related hypotheses for this
study as well as the population, sample, instrument and survey design, data collection
procedures and statistical procedures to be used. The questionnaire, developed and
distributed to international school directors by the researcher, was key to the study. The
questionnaire asked the same individuals to answer a number of open-ended questions in
paragraph form. This study employed quantitative research procedures and qualitative
techniques, utilized various statistical analysis and qualitative content methods to answer
the research questions: these included Spearman’s rank-order correlation, a point-biserial
correlation and a one-way ANOVA.
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Chapter 4
Findings
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to examine the self-reported causes of turnover of
international school directors. Specifically, this study examined whether the relationship
between the school board and the international school director is linked to tenure of the
international director in their previous position.
Data were gathered through a questionnaire including director gender, race, age,
highest degree achieved, and tenure in their previous position as international school
directors. Each respondent who completed the questionnaire was asked to respond to an
open-ended question explaining why they left their last position. The data were analyzed
to determine whether the relationship between the school board and the international
school director is linked to tenure in their previous position. Furthermore, data was
collected from respondents to see if tenure in their previous position was impacted by a
variety of variables, such as: age, gender, race, and highest degree achieved.
To collect data on international school director demographics, board/director
relationship, and reasons for director turnover, an invitation with a web-link to a 15question on-line questionnaire (see Appendix A) was sent to 306 international school
directors and administrators in various international schools, both for profit and nonprofit, around the world, including South America, Europe, Africa, Asia and Southeast
Asia. These directors and administrators were asked specific demographic questions
about themselves: age, gender, race, highest degree achieved; and length of tenure in their
previous position; plus a question that asked specifically about the school board-
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superintendent relationship in the previous position (question 14, Appendix A).
Additionally, the questionnaire included two open-ended items about reasons for
leaving their previous position, which were:
1. Please describe your reason for leaving your previous position.
2. Please add any additional information regarding your previous turnover and
the relationship with the board.
The returned questionnaires were then analyzed qualitatively with an emergent
theme method (as described in Chapter 3), and quantitatively with Spearman’s rho, for
their various reasons for turnover as well as the Director/Board relationship.
Instrument Return Rate
A total of 155 questionnaires out of 306 were returned, an overall response rate of
51%. Completed instruments were examined to determine whether the respondents
followed the instructions properly and provided complete responses. After first filtering
in SPSS for respondents who answered “yes” to question 1 in the questionnaire, In your
previous position, were you an international school director/superintendent or
administrator?, 139 usable questionnaires remained. Next, question 3, Did you report to
a board of directors/education? was assessed, and any questionnaire from an
administrator who did not report directly to a school board or group of owner
stakeholders (functioning as a school board) was discarded. There were a few
respondents who listed “other” in response to the question. However, their explanations
made it was clear that they had reported to a school board, and the respondents were
clarifying whether the board was elected or appointed. So these cases were recoded for
inclusion, leaving a dataset of 121 usable self-reported instruments.
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Of the 121 questionnaires deemed suitable for use, some of the administrators did
not specify their gender, age or years in previous position, while appropriately answering
their reason(s) for turnover. This is the explanation for some of the variability in the
questionnaire numbers used in the statistical analysis. One respondent did not answer
question 12, Years in previous position. That case was excluded from consideration of
research questions 2 and 3, leaving a total n value of n = 120 for those questions.
Findings as They Relate to the Research Questions
The findings below are reported as they pertain to the following three research
questions investigated in this study:
1. What factors influence the turnover of international school directors?
2. Does relationship between school board members and international school
directors correlate to length of tenure?
3. Is there a significant relationship between the age, gender, race, highest degree
achieved, and tenure in their previous position?
Research question one. In order to address the first research question, What
factors influence turnover of international school directors? the written reasons for
turnover (question 13, Appendix B) were analyzed using an emergent theme method (as
described in Chapter 3) and five general categories emerged: “Board,” “Contract,”
“Opportunity,” “Retirement,” and “Environmental.” The “Board” category encompassed
board relations or conflict with board. The “Contract” category included responses such
as “contract ended” and “contract not renewed,” and simply “contract.” The
“Opportunity” category included responses indicative of acquiring better
opportunities/career advancement. The “Retirement” category was self-descriptive. The
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“Environmental” category included outside civil unrest, school closure, governmental
interference, job stress, and personal and family reasons (Appendix B).
Answers coded “Board” indicate that at some point in answering question 13, the
respondent indicated that a negative or strained relationship with the board was a factor in
their turnover. In looking further into the 121 responses, three did not respond to question
13, thus leaving 118 cases. Of those, 20 presented two reasons for turnover, all of which
were counted. This resulted in the percentages of responses for the group totaling 117%,
but it did not artificially inflate one category relative to the rest. Question 13 yielded 138
responses that fell into the five categories as described in Table 1.
Table 1
Reason for Leaving
Question #13, Reason for Leaving... 5 Categories (n = 118).
Category
Board
Environmental
Contract
Number of
39
36
26
Responses
Percentage
28%
26%
19%
(Responses)
Percentage
33%
31%
22%
(Respondents)

Opportunity

Retirement

Total

24

13

138

17%

9%

100%

20%

11%

117%

Retirement

Total

3

94

3%

100%

4%

122%

Question #13, Reason for Leaving... After 4 Years or Less (n = 77).
Category
Board
Environmental
Contract
Opportunity
Number of
32
21
25
13
Responses
Percentage
34%
22%
27%
14%
(Responses)
Percentage
42%
27%
32%
17%
(Respondents)

Table 1 above suggests that the top three reasons for international school directors
to leave their previous position were: school board relationship (28%), environmental
(26%), and contract (19%). The lower half of Table 1 focuses on the subset of 77
respondents whose previous tenure was four years or less. The percentage of responses in
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the “Board” category is even larger, suggesting that relationship with the board is a
bigger factor in cases of short tenure; and the percentage of responses in the “Retirement”
category is much smaller, suggesting that retirement is rarely a factor in cases of short
tenure.
The responses in Table 1 total more than the 118 cases (for the full dataset) and
more than the 77 cases (for the four-years-or-less subset) presented, because 20 and 17
cases respectively had responses indicative of two reasons for turnover. All reasons were
counted to avoid artificially inflating one category relative to the others, so some cases
were counted twice.
Based on these results, the top three factors that answer the first research question,
“What factors influence turnover of international school directors?” are 1) the school
board, which suggests school board relationship; 2) environmental factors, which include
personal reasons and factors beyond the respondents’ control (such as war or school
closure); and 3) contract completion. These factors are detailed in Appendix B.
“Contract” responses to question 13 were cross-referenced to question 14 (Please
rate your relationship with your previous school board on a 5-point Likert-type scale)
and question 15 (Please add any additional information regarding your previous
turnover and the relationship with the board). Of the 26 respondents whose question 13
answers were classified as “Contract,” 20 self-reported “poor” or “very poor relationship”
on question 14, including 9 who answered open-ended question 15 in a way that
underscored the poor relationship with their previous board as a factor in leaving their
previous position. This provides evidence that even among the question 13 self-reported
“Contract” respondents, on probing further, 77% had a “Poor” or “Very Poor”

46
relationship with their board that may have been a contributing factor in leaving their
previous position. Similarly, question 13 responses categorized as Environmental had 10
(including one overlapping with the “Contract” responses described above) “Poor” or
“Very Poor” responses to question 14 Rate your relationship…; and even among the
“Very Good” or “Good” responses, there were five answers to question 15, the openended Please add any additional information question, that at least partly implicated
board relations as a possible reason for departure (see Table 2).
Table 2
Responses Highlighting Relationship with Board as a Likely Factor in Turnover
Question 13 –
Reason for
Leaving,
categorized by
researcher

Question 14 – Relationship with
Board
Likert rating of
Frequency
relationship with
Board

Board:
39 of 118

Very Good and Good
Neutral
Poor and Very Poor
Very Good and Good
Neutral
Poor and Very Poor
Very Good and Good
Neutral
Poor and Very Poor
Very Good and Good
Neutral
Poor and Very Poor
Very Good and Good
Neutral
Poor and Very Poor

Environmental:
36 of 118
Contract:
26 of 118
Opportunity:
24 of 118
Retirement:
13 of 118

Question 15 – Additional Information
Indicating Board
as a reason for
departure

3
3
33
21
5
10
4
2
20
16
7
1
9
2
2

2
1
26
5
0
3
0
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
1

Blank, or otherwise
not indicating Board
as a reason for
departure
1
2
7
16
5
7
4
2
11
16
7
1
9
2
1

Focusing on the 77 who left after four years or less gives similar results, as seen
in Table 3. As with Table 2, the frequencies sum to more than the 77 cases presented,
because two categories were indicated in 17 of the cases.
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Table 3
Tenures of 4 Years or Less and Relationship with the Previous School Board
Question 13 –
Reason for
Leaving

Question 14 – Relationship with
Board
Likert rating of
Frequency
relationship with
Board

Board:
32 of 77

Very Good and Good
Neutral
Poor and Very Poor
Very Good and Good
Neutral
Poor and Very Poor
Very Good and Good
Neutral
Poor and Very Poor
Very Good and Good
Neutral
Poor and Very Poor
Very Good and Good
Neutral
Poor and Very Poor

Contract:
25 of 77
Environmental:
20 of 77
Opportunity:
13 of 77
Retirement:
2 of 77

1
2
29
4
2
19
9
4
7
8
4
1
1
0
1

Question 15 – Additional Information
Indicating Board
as a reason for
departure
0
1
23
0
0
8
1
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0

Blank, or otherwise
not indicating Board
as a reason for
departure
1
1
6
4
2
11
8
4
4
8
4
1
1
0
1

The frequencies given in Table 2, above, sum to 138, but there were only 118
viable cases. There were 20 cases that indicated two reasons for turnover, and so were
counted twice. Table 3 shows similar information for cases with tenure of four years or
less, and similarly double counts the 17 cases that indicated two reasons for turnover.
Table 4 contrasts cases that indicated “board” or “relationship” at least once in
questions 13, 14, and/or 15 with cases that did not.
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Table 4
Frequency of Cases with Board or Relationship as Possible Turnover Factor
Board/Relationship

How many times “Board” or

potentially

“Relationship” potentially implicated

implicated?
Yes

3 times

2 times

1 time

19

17

22

No

Total

Percentage

58

49%

60

51%

118

100%

0 times
60

Total

Tenure ≤ 4 Years, Cases with Board or Relationship as Possible Turnover Factor
Yes
No
Total

16

13

18
30

47

61%

30

39%

77

100%

So, approximately 49% of cases (detailed in Appendix C) in some way indicated
that the relationship with the board was potentially a factor in the previous turnover.
Among the cases with tenure of four years or shorter, relationship with the board was
potentially implicated in approximately 61% of cases. Descriptive data seemed to
indicate a possible factor for international school directors to leave their previous position
was the quality of relationship between the international school director and the school
board.
Research question two. In examining the second research question, “Does
relationship between school board members and international school directors correlate to
length of tenure?” the descriptive data reported in Table 2, Table 3, and
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Table 4 above supported an argument that the relationship between the school
board and the director may be correlated with turnover.
As noted in the findings above, most international school directors who leave
their previous position due to the “Board” also indicated their relationship with the school
board was “Poor” or “Very Poor.” These findings provided some evidence for the second
research question, “Does relationship between school board members and international
school directors correlate to length of tenure?” All 120 respondents to question 14, Please
rate your relationship with your previous school board on the following scale (choose
one) are shown in Table 5.
Table 5
Frequency of Responses to Question 14: Relationship with Previous School Board
Relationship Rating

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

Very Good Relationship

28

23.3

23.3

Good Relationship

26

21.7

45.0

Neutral

18

15.0

60.0

Poor Relationship

26

21.7

81.7

Very Poor Relationship

22

18.3

100.0

Total

120

100.0

Table 5 showed that out of the 120 respondents, 54 self-reported that their
relationship with their school board was “Good” or “Very Good.” In addition, 48
respondents self-reported that their relationship with their school board was “Poor” or
“Very Poor.” Further, the 18 respondents who marked “Neutral,” were cross-referenced
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with the other questions that indicated the type of relationship that existed between the
Director and Board Members. Of those 18 “Neutral” responses to question 14 Please rate
your relationship with your previous school board on the following scale (choose one),
three reported “Board” as a reason for departure in questions 13 and 15. Therefore, after
further analysis, 51 respondents reported a negative relationship with their school board.
Descriptive statistics for question 12, where respondents were asked about the
length of tenure in their previous position, are included in Table 6.
Table 6
Responses to Question 12, Years in Previous Position
Years of Tenure

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

Less than 1

6

5.0

5.0

1

5

4.2

9.2

2

8

6.7

15.8

3

41

34.2

50.0

4

18

15.0

65.0

5

9

7.5

72.5

6

8

6.7

79.2

7

8

6.7

85.8

8

5

4.2

90.0

10

5

4.2

94.2

11

1

.8

95.0

12

3

2.5

97.5

15

1

.8

98.3

17

1

.8

99.2

21

1

.8

100.0

120

100.0

Total

In Table 6, the first five rows add up to 78 respondents who reported they left
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their previous position in four years or less. In examining the second research question,
Does relationship between school board members and international school directors
correlate to director turnover? anecdotal experience indicated the relationship between
the school board and director will correlate with turnover. Furthermore, as seen in Table
3 and Table 4, if the relationship between the school board and director is poor, it is
predicted that the director is likely to report they left their position within a four year
margin – three years is the typical initial contract of an international school director (as
indicated on the questionnaire – Appendix A).
Spearman’s rho for research question two. The researcher undertook to use
Spearman’s rho to investigate the correlation between length of international school
director tenure and quality of relationship with the school board. Spearman’s rho requires
three assumptions. First, one must have two variables that are continuous and/or ordinal.
The variables used for this analysis were length of tenure and quality of relationship with
previous board.
Data on tenure was from question 12 “length of tenure in years” with possible
responses of “Less than 1 year,” “1 year,” “2 years,” etc., up through “29 years,” and
finally “30 years or more.” For this analysis, the six “Less than 1 year” responses were
each approximated as .5 years. There were no “30 years or more” responses, so the upper
end of the tenure scale did not need approximation. In this way, a ratio variable was
obtained for length of tenure. Data for the second variable was from question 14 which,
via a 5-point Likert-type scale, captured “quality of relationship with the board” as an
ordinal variable. These satisfied the first assumption for Spearman’s rho.
Second, the two variables must represent paired observations—that is, for each
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answer to question 12, there is a corresponding answer to question 14. Of the 121
qualified respondents, only case #100 did not answer the tenure question. So, case 100
was filtered out to meet the second assumption for Spearman’s rho.
Third, there must be a monotonic relationship between the two variables—in
other words, as the tenure variable increases, the relationship variable also consistently
either increases or decreases—see scatterplot Figure 2, and boxplots, Figure 3.

Figure 2. Scatterplot: Relationship with Board and Years of Tenure.
The scatterplot (with point dodging to show frequencies) in Figure 2 shows a
generally monotonic relationship between the variables, despite the presence of outliers.
In particular, the three respondents with tenures of 15 years or more are all in the “Good
Relationship” category, causing a minor inconsistency in the monotonic relationship
between variables. Furthermore, only cases rating their board relationship as neutral,
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poor, or very poor, reported tenure of “less than one year” (here approximated as .5 year).
The boxplots in Figure 3 give another view of these variables.

Figure 3. Boxplots: Relationship with Board and Years of Tenure.
The boxplots in Figure 3 explicitly show the outliers in the data. In the “Poor
Relationship” group, nearly all respondents lasted three years, which is the industry
standard initial contract length for international school directors. In case #1, the
respondent’s length of tenure was 12 years despite a reported poor relationship with the
board; and her response to question 13 was “Needed a change / change of board.” Based
on this, the researcher speculates that the relationship was good for the bulk of the
respondent’s tenure, and was only “poor” when the board changed, probably for only a
year or two.
With the three assumptions met, the researcher ran a bivariate procedure in SPSS
to find the Spearman’s rank-order correlation among the variables (see Table 7 below).
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Table 7
Spearman’s Rho for Relationship and Length of Tenure
Variables

Statistics

Length of Tenure in Years

Quality of Relationship with

Correlation Coefficient

Board (5-Point Likert Scale)

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N

120

-.419**

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Based on Table 7, there was a statistically significant moderate correlation
between quality of relationship with the board and length of tenure, rs (120) = -.419, p <
.001. The “negative” direction of the correlation coefficient is due to coding “Very Good
Relationship” as “1,” and “Very Poor Relationship” as “5,” which reflects the order in
which responses were presented on the questionnaire, to reduce the likelihood of order
bias. Spearman’s rho reflects the relationship between two variables insofar as the
relationship is monotonic. If the relationship is not monotonic, Spearman’s rho
underestimates the strength of the relationship. With this result, the researcher finds
evidence to reject the null hypothesis, and accept the hypothesis that there is a moderate
statistically significant relationship between international school directors’ relationships
with their boards and the length of their tenure.
Research question three. Finally, in reviewing research question 3, Is there a
significant relationship between the age, gender, race, highest degree achieved, and
tenure in their previous position? the researcher sought correlations between the
demographic independent variables and length of tenure. Two of the demographic
factors, age group and highest degree attained, were ordinal, and assessed with respect to
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length of tenure via Spearman’s rank-order correlation. Two other variables, gender and
race, were not ordinal. Gender, a dichotomous variable, was attempted with a pointbiserial correlation procedure. Race/ethnicity, a categorical variable, was first attempted
with a one-way ANOVA procedure. When the underlying assumptions of ANOVA were
not met, it was considered as a dichotomous variable, “white” (n = 86) or “non-white” (n
= 34), and attempted with a point-biserial correlation.
Analyzing highest academic degree and years of tenure. The researcher used
Spearman’s rank-order correlation to assess the relationship between the highest
academic degree attained by respondents and the length of tenure respondents reported
for their previous position. The procedure requires three assumptions.
First, the variables must be ordinal or continuous. The dependent variable, tenure,
is a quasi-continuous variable, treated as ordinal for this analysis. The data representing
highest academic degree attained, from question 10, had one respondent who answered
“Other” and gave the explanation “Educational Specialist.” This case was excluded from
this analysis. The remaining cases are ordered Bachelor’s, Master’s, and PhD/EdD, so the
independent variable for highest degree achieved is ordinal, and the assumption is met.
Second, the variables must represent paired observations. The dataset of 121
qualified respondents had one who did not answer question 12 about length of tenure,
bringing the number to 120. Another respondent who answered “Other” was excluded,
leaving a dataset of 119 cases who answered both questions 10 and 12. Thus, the second
assumption was met.
Third, there must be a monotonic relationship between variables. To check this
assumption, the researcher used SPSS to generate a scatterplot (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Scatterplot: Highest Academic Degree Achieved and Years of Tenure.
Visual inspection of the scatterplot for highest degree achieved and length of
tenure (Figure 4) provided evidence of a monotonic relationship between the variables,
satisfying the third assumption. So, the researcher generated SPSS output for Spearman’s
rho.
The procedure found a very weak and statistically non-significant correlation
between highest academic degree attained and length of tenure, rs (119) = .110, p = .232,
as shown in Table 8. From this, the researcher finds no evidence of correlation between
highest degree attained and length of tenure, and no evidence of highest academic degree
as a factor in international school superintendent turnover.
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Table 8
Spearman’s Rho for Highest Degree Attained and Length of Tenure
Variable

Statistics

Length of Tenure in Years

Highest Academic

Correlation Coefficient

.110

Degree Achieved

Sig. (2-tailed)

.232

N

119

Analyzing age group and years of tenure. Three assumptions are necessary for
Spearman’s rank-order correlation. There must be two variables that are (1) ordinal or
continuous, and (2) represent paired observations, and (3) exhibit a monotonic
relationship.
The dependent variable, length of tenure, is a quasi-continuous variable that we
can treat as ordinal for this analysis. The independent variable, age range (from question
8) is ordinal. So, assumption (1) was met.
The dataset of 121 qualified respondents included one, case #100, who did not
answer question 12 about length of tenure, bringing the number of cases to 120. Of those,
all answered question 8 about age group. Thus, assumption (2) was met.
To test assumption (3), monotonic relationship between variables, the researcher
used SPSS to generate a scatterplot comparing the variables—see Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Scatterplot: Age Ranges and Length of Tenure.
Visual inspection of the scatterplot with point dodging and interpolation line for
age range and length of tenure provided some evidence of a monotonic relationship
between the variables. For a truly monotonic relationship, for each level of age range,
length of tenure should increase; but there’s an evident decrease from the 30-39 level to
the 40-49 level. The other levels did show increasing length of tenure as age range
increases. Since the 30-39 level consists of only two observations, the researcher
considered assumption (3) of a monotonic relationship was reasonably met.
With the necessary assumptions met, the researcher used an SPSS bivariate
process to find Spearman’s rho. The procedure found a weak and statistically significant
relationship between age range and length of tenure, rs (120) = .266, p = .003, as shown
in Table 9.
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Table 9
Spearman’s Rho for Age Group and Length of Tenure
Variable
Your age (select a range)

Statistics
Correlation Coefficient

Length of Tenure in Years
.266**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.003

N

120

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Analyzing gender and years of tenure. The researcher used SPSS to find the
point-biserial correlation coefficient to examine the relationship between gender and
length of tenure. The gender variable consisted of data from question 9 on the
questionnaire. The tenure data was from question 12. There were six answers to question
12 in the “Less than 1 year” category, which the researcher approximated as .5 year each
to obtain a continuous variable for length of tenure.
The dataset of 121 qualified respondents included one who did not answer
question 12 about years of tenure, leaving 120 cases. Of those, there were four who did
not answer question 9 about gender, leaving a dataset of 116 for this analysis.
Six assumptions must be met for a point-biserial correlation. (1) One of the
variables must be continuous. The tenure variable, as a ratio variable, meets this
requirement. (2) The other variable should be dichotomous. The gender variable meets
this assumption. (3) The variables should be paired. The dataset of 116 cases meets these
requirements.
Of the remaining three assumptions, relating to how the dataset fits the pointbiserial correlation model, two were problematic.
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Assumption (4) is that the continuous variable, tenure, should have no significant
outliers in either of the gender categories. Inspection of boxplots (see Figure 6) showed
that outliers were present in both categories of gender, including two “extreme” outliers.

Figure 6. Boxplots: Genders and Length of Tenure.
Assumption (5) is that the variance of the continuous variable, tenure, should be
equal in both of the gender categories. Homogeneity of variances was tested using
Levene’s test of equality of variances. A statistically significant result of p < .05 would
indicate violation of the assumption of homogeneity of variances. This test found there
was homogeneity of variances for length of tenure for males and females (p = .072), as
seen in Table 10, thus satisfying assumption (5).
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Table 10
Test of Homogeneity of Variance for Genders and Tenure
Levene
Variable

Statistic

Statistic

df1

df2

Length of

Based on Mean

3.290

1

114

.072

Tenure in

Based on Median

1.504

1

114

.223

Years

Based on Median and with adjusted df

1.504

1 107.308

.223

Based on trimmed mean

2.655

1

.106

114

Sig.

Assumption (6) is that the continuous variable, tenure, should have normal
distribution in each group of the gender variable. Table 11 shows the dataset does not
meet the Shapiro-Wilk test for normal distribution (p < 0.05).
Table 11
Tests of Normality for Genders and Tenure
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Statistic

df

Sig.

Shapiro-Wilk

Variable

Your gender

Statistic

df

Length of Tenure

Male

.224

80

.000

.815

80

.000

in Years

Female

.234

36

.000

.813

36

.000

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
Also, the histograms in Figure 7—male on the left, female on the right—both
exhibit kurtosis and positive skewness, and show that assumption (6) is not met.

Sig.
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Figure 7. Histograms: Genders and Length of Tenure.
Since the dataset did not meet the necessary assumptions for normal distribution
and lack of significant outliers, the researcher used log (variable + 1) to transform the
continuous variable, representing tenure data from question 12. This transformation
decreased outliers and improved normality, as shown in the boxplots of Figure 8 and the
histograms of Figure 9.

Figure 8. Boxplots: Genders and Transformed Tenure.
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Figure 9. Histograms: Genders and Transformed Tenure.
Assessing equality of variances, Levene’s test found homogeneity of variances for
gender and length of tenure (p = .265), shown in Table 12.
Table 12
Test of Homogeneity of Variance with Transformed Tenure
Levene
Variable

Statistics

Tenure with

Based on Mean

1.256

1

114

.265

log(+1)

Based on Median

1.024

1

114

.314

transformation

Based on Median and

1.024

1

113.126

.314

applied

with adjusted df
1.287

1

114

.259

Based on trimmed mean

Statistic

df1

df2

Sig.

Testing further for normal distribution, the researcher examined Q-Q plots
generated by SPSS and found that, with the transformed tenure variable, scores were
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approximately normally distributed (see Figure 10; “male” is shown on the left and
“female” on the right).

Figure 10. Q-Q Plots: Genders and Transformed Tenure.
Having met the assumptions necessary for a point-biserial correlation, the
researcher ran the procedure using the transformed tenure variable, and found a very
small and statistically non-significant correlation between gender and length of tenure,
rpb(114) = .079, p = .401, as shown in Table 13.
Table 13
Correlations: Gender and Transformed Tenure
Variable

Statistics

Tenure with Transformation

Gender

Pearson Correlation

.079

Sig. (2-tailed)

.401

N

116
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Looking at descriptive statistics for gender and the transformed tenure variable
(see Table 14), the 80 males had back-transformed tenure M = 4.82 years (SD = .212),
95%CI (4.32, 5.37), and the 36 females had back-transformed tenure M = 5.27 years (SD
= .263), 95%CI (4.29, 6.47).
Table 14
Descriptive Statistics for Genders and Transformed Tenure
Dependent Variable

Gender

Statistics

Tenure with
Transformation
Applied

Male

Mean
95% Confidence
Interval for Mean

Statistic Std. Error
.6829
Lower Bound

.6357

Upper Bound

.7301

5% Trimmed Mean

.6819

Median

.6021

Variance

.045

Std. Deviation

.21201

Minimum

.18

Maximum

1.26

Range

1.08

Interquartile Range

Female

.02370

.24

Skewness

.130

.269

Kurtosis

.547

.532

.7216

.04383

Mean
95% Confidence
Interval for Mean

Lower Bound

.6326

Upper Bound

.8106

5% Trimmed Mean

.7231

Median

.6990

Variance

.069

Std. Deviation

.26295

Minimum

.18

Maximum

1.34

Range

1.17

Interquartile Range

.30

Skewness

-.043

.393

Kurtosis

.450

.768
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Analyzing race and years of tenure—one-way ANOVA. The dataset of 121
qualified respondents included one who did not answer question 12 about years of tenure,
bringing the number to 120, all of whom answered question 11 about race/ ethnicity.
Question 12 permitted each respondent to choose only one racial category, presented
graphically in Figure 11.
Arabic

10

Asian

9

Black (African)

0

Hispanic

8

Indigenous Australian

0

Native American/Alaskan Native

0

Pacific Islander

0

Persian

1

White (European/Caucasian)

86

Other

6
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Figure 11. Response Frequencies for 10 Racial Categories.
The researcher attempted to use a one-way ANOVA process to investigate the
relationship between race or ethnicity and length of tenure. However, the dataset did not
meet the assumptions necessary for one-way ANOVA, even after transforming the
dependent variable with the log(Tenure_Ratio + 1) method that had improved outliers
and normality for gender.
The first assumption—a continuous dependent variable—is met because length of
tenure was measured as a quasi-continuous variable with possible answers ranging from
“Less than 1 year”, “1 year,” “2 years,” etc., up through “29 years,” and finally “30 years
or more.” The briefest tenure, chosen by six respondents, was “less than 1 year,” which
was approximated as .5 year to obtain a continuous variable. No respondents’ chose “30
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years or more,” so no additional approximation was necessary. This assumption
continued to be met when the log(variable + 1) transformation was applied.
The second assumption—a categorical independent variable with at least two
independent groups—is met because respondents could select only one of the ten racial
groups provided. The third assumption—independence of observations—is met for the
same reason.
The fourth assumption—no significant outliers in the independent variable
categories—was not met, as evidenced by the boxplots in Figure 12 below.

Figure 12. Boxplots: Race/Ethnicity and Tenure.
Incidence of outliers was improved only slightly by the log(variable + 1)
transformation. Quantity of outliers decreased from seven (as in Figure 12) to six (shown
in Figure 13 below). This includes “extreme” outliers, which decreased from three to two.
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Figure 13. Boxplots: Race/Ethnicity and Transformed Tenure.
The fifth assumption—tenure should be approximately normally distributed for
each racial group—was not met. In Figure 14, histograms of the “White (European/
Caucasian)” racial group (n = 86) show positive skew and kurtosis with the
untransformed tenure variable on the left. On the right, after the log(variable + 1)
transformation, the variable still showed kurtosis, though skew was improved.

Figure 14. Histograms: Race (White) and Tenure, Untransformed and Transformed.
The “Hispanic” racial group, shown in Figure 15 below, with n = 8, had nonnormal distribution before and after transformation of the tenure variable.
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Figure 15. Histograms: Race (Hispanic) and Tenure, Untransformed and Transformed.
The “Arabic” racial group (n = 10) showed somewhat improved skewness and
kurtosis after transformation of the tenure variable (see Figure 16).

Figure 16. Histograms: Race (Arabic) and Tenure, Untransformed and Transformed.
Q-Q plots for the racial categories, with the tenure variable untransformed and
transformed, mostly did not show normal distributions. Figure 17 shows Q-Q plots for
the three racial categories discussed above—White (European/Caucasian), Hispanic, and
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Arabic. On the left are plots with “years of tenure” represented by the untransformed
tenure variable, and the plots on the right have “years of tenure” with the log(variable +
1) transformation applied. As seen previously in the histograms, this transformation
improved normality for the “White (European/Caucasian)” racial group, but did not much
help the other racial categories.

Figure 17. Q-Q Plots: 3 Racial Groups and Tenure, Untransformed and Transformed.
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With two key assumptions of one-way ANOVA unmet—lack of outliers, and
normality of distribution in all categories of the independent variable—the researcher did
not run the one-way ANOVA.
Analyzing race: White and years of tenure—point-biserial correlation. With
such small sizes of most of the racial groups, it is unsurprising that distributions did not
approximate normality. But with all the “non-white” ethnicities considered together, the
sample would have white (n = 86) and non-white (n = 34). So the researcher considered
“race/ ethnicity” in binary terms as white or non-white, to see what inferences could be
drawn about the correlation of self-identification as racially “white” and length of tenure.
Using data from question 11, the race/ethnicity variable was recoded with just two
categories, white and non-white, and a point-biserial correlation was performed in SPSS.
The dataset of 121 qualified respondents included one who did not answer
question 12 about years of tenure, bringing the number to 120. Of those, all 120 answered
question 11 about race/ethnicity, leaving 120 cases for this analysis.
Point-biserial correlation requires six assumptions. (1) The tenure variable meets
the requirement of a continuous variable, but did not meet other assumptions, so the
analysis was performed with a log(variable + 1) transformation, resulting in a
transformed tenure variable which also meets the requirement of a continuous variable.
(2) The white/non-white variable meets the requirement of a dichotomous variable. (3)
The variables represent paired observations, meeting the third requirement.
Assumption (4) is that there are no outliers. This was not met with the
untransformed tenure variable, but it was reasonably met with the transformed tenure
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variable. Incidence of outliers was reduced from seven to four, including reducing
extreme outliers from two to zero, as shown in the boxplots in Figure 18.

Figure 18. Boxplots: Non-White/White and Tenure, Untransformed and Transformed.
Assumption (5) is that there is homogeneity of variances for both racial
categories. This was tested with Levene’s test of equality of variances, and was met for
both the untransformed tenure variable (p = .140), shown in Table 15, and for the
transformed tenure variable (p = .776), seen in Table 16.
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Table 15
Test of Homogeneity of Variance with Untransformed Tenure Variable
Levene
Dependent Variables Methods

Statistic

df1

df2

Sig.

Years of Tenure

Based on Mean

2.213

1

118

.140

(Untransformed)

Based on Median

1.157

1

118

.284

Based on Median

1.157

1 111.331

.284

1.695

1

.196

and with adjusted df
Based on trimmed

118

mean

Table 16
Test of Homogeneity of Variance with Transformed Tenure Variable
Levene
Dependent Variables Methods

Statistic

df1

df2

Sig.

Years of Tenure

Based on Mean

.081

1

118

.776

(with Log(+1)

Based on Median

.091

1

118

.763

Transformation)

Based on Median

.091

1 117.914

.763

.077

1

.781

and with adjusted df
Based on trimmed
mean

118
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Assumption (6) is that the continuous variable should be distributed
approximately normally for both racial groups. This was not met with the untransformed
tenure variable, but it was met with the transformed tenure variable, as shown in the Q-Q
plots for the non-white racial group (Figure 19), and for the white racial group (Figure
20).

Figure 19. Q-Q Plots: Race: Non-White and Tenure, Untransformed and Transformed.

Figure 20. Q-Q Plots: Race: White and Tenure, Untransformed and Transformed.
With the six key assumptions underlying the point-biserial correlation relatively
well met, the researcher used SPSS to run the point-biserial correlation procedure.
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Descriptive statistics for non-white or white racial group and the transformed
tenure variable are in Table 17. For the non-white racial category, mean tenure (backtransformed from the transformed tenure variable) was 4.32 years (SD = .225), 95%CI
(3.60, 5.17). For the white racial category, back-transformed mean tenure was 5.15 years
(SD = .230), 95%CI (4.60, 5.77).
Table 17
Descriptive Statistics for Non-White or White and Transformed Tenure
Dependent
Variables

White or
Non-White
Racial Group

Statistics

Tenure with

Non-White

Mean

.6350

Transformation

(Non-Euro. /

.5565

Applied

Non-Cauc.)

95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound
for Mean
Upper Bound
5% Trimmed Mean

.6356

Median

.6021

Variance

.051

Std. Deviation

Statistic

.03861

.7136

.22515

Minimum

.18

Maximum

1.11

Range

.94

Interquartile Range

.30

Skewness

-.207

.403

Kurtosis

.301

.788
.02480

White

Mean

.7121

(European /

95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound
for Mean
Upper Bound

.6628

5% Trimmed Mean

.7115

Median

.6990

Variance

.053

Caucasian)

Std. Error

Std. Deviation

.7614

.23001

Minimum

.18

Maximum

1.34

Range

1.17

Interquartile Range

.24

Skewness

.145

.260

Kurtosis

.591

.514
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There was a very small and statistically non-significant point-biserial correlation
between Non-White or White racial grouping and the transformed tenure variable,
rpb(118) = .151, p = .099 (see Table 18).
Table 18
Correlations: Non-White or White and Transformed Tenure
Variable

Statistics

Tenure with Transformation

Non-White or White

Pearson Correlation

.151

Racial Group

Sig. (2-tailed)

.099

N

120

Table 19 and
Table 20 summarize the correlations found in this study.
Table 19
Correlations: Spearman’s Rho
Variables

Statistics

Highest Academic Degree

Correlation Coefficient

.110

Achieved

Sig. (2-tailed)

.232

N

119

Age Group

Correlation Coefficient

Length of Tenure in Years

.266**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.003

N

120
-.419**

Quality of Relationship with

Correlation Coefficient

Board (5-Point Likert Scale)

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N

120
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**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 20
Correlations: Point-Biserial
Variable

Statistics

Tenure with Transformation

Gender:

Pearson Correlation

.079

Male or Female

Sig. (2-tailed)

.401

N

116

Race:

Pearson Correlation

.151

Non-White or White

Sig. (2-tailed)

.099

N

120

After reviewing the data from the Spearman’s rho, point-bivariate, and ANOVA
analyses, the researcher can address the null hypotheses for research question 3, listed
below:
1. International school director gender is not significantly related to tenure in
their previous position (H0 is not rejected).
2. International school director racial group could not be assessed with one-way
ANOVA because the underlying assumptions were not met. A point-biserial
procedure found a very small and statistically non-significant correlation
between white racial group and length of tenure (H0 is not rejected).
3. International school director highest degree earned is not significantly related
to tenure in their previous position (H0 is not rejected).
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4. International school director age group is significantly related to tenure in
their previous position (H0 is rejected).
Summary
Chapter 4 described the instrument return rate, findings from the data gathered by
the researcher as they related to three research questions and the hypotheses for this
study. For question one, What factors influence turnover of international school
directors? the researcher determined that the written reasons for turnover (question 13,
Appendix A) fell into five general categories: “Board,” “Contract,” “Opportunity,”
“Retirement,” and “Environmental.” Furthermore, descriptive data seemed to indicate the
quality of relationship between the international school director and the school board was
possibly a factor for international school directors to leave their previous position.
For the second research question, Does relationship between school board
members and international school directors correlate to length of tenure? a Spearman’s
rank-order correlation was run to assess the relationship between the directors’ quality of
relationship with their boards and the directors’ length of tenure, and found a moderate,
statistically significant correlation between “quality of relationship” and “length of
tenure,” rs (120) = -.419, p < .001. The negative direction of the correlation was due to
coding “Very Good Relationship” as 1 and “Very Poor Relationship” as 5, so this
correlation should be understood as: poorer relationships correlate with shorter tenure,
and better relationships correlate with longer tenure.
For research question number three, Is there a significant relationship between the
age, gender, race, highest degree achieved, and tenure in their previous position? a
Spearman’s rank-order correlation found a very weak and statistically non-significant
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correlation between highest academic degree attained and length of tenure, rs (119) =
.110, p = .232. A Spearman’s rank-order correlation found a weak and statistically
significant relationship between age range and length of tenure, rs (120) = .266, p = .003.
A point-biserial correlation for gender and length of tenure found a very small and
statistically non-significant correlation between gender and length of tenure, rpb(114) =
.079, p = .401. A one-way ANOVA was unsuccessful at determining correlation between
racial group and length of tenure, and a point-biserial correlation for white vs. non-white
racial group and length of tenure found a very small and statistically non-significant
correlation, rpb(118) = .151, p = .099.
After reviewing the data from the Spearman’s rho, point-bivariate, and ANOVA
analyses, the researcher can address the null hypotheses for research question 3, listed
below:
1. International school director gender is not significantly related to tenure in
their previous position (H0 is not rejected).
2. International school director racial group could not be assessed with one-way
ANOVA because the underlying assumptions were not met. A point-biserial
procedure found a very weak and statistically non-significant correlation
between white racial group and length of tenure (H0 is not rejected).
3. International school director highest degree earned is not significantly related
to tenure in their previous position (H0 is not rejected).
4. International school director age group is significantly related to tenure in
their previous position (H0 is rejected).
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Introduction
Using a theoretical framework of the Decision-Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst,
2005), this study explored possible reasons for international school director tenure in
previous positions. This study narrowed the focus on the relationship between school
boards and international school directors, through the use of a questionnaire of
international school directors from South America, Europe, Africa, Asia and Southeast
Asia.
The purpose of this study was to examine the self-reported causes of turnover of
international school directors. Specifically, this study examined whether the relationship
between the school board and the international school director is linked to tenure of the
international director in their previous position.
Summary of Research Findings
Chapter 4 described the instrument return rate, findings from the data gathered by
the researcher as they related to three research questions and the hypotheses for this
study. For question one, What factors influence turnover of international school
directors? the researcher determined that the written reasons for turnover (question 13,
Appendix A) fell into five general categories: “Board,” “Contract,” “Opportunity,”
“Retirement,” and “Environmental.” Furthermore, descriptive data seem to indicate that
the quality of the relationship between the international school director and the school
board is possibly a factor for international school directors to leave their previous
position.
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For the second research question, “Does relationship between school board
members and international school directors correlate to length of tenure?” a Spearman’s
rank-order correlation was run to assess the relationship between the directors’ quality of
relationship with their boards and the directors’ length of tenure. Preliminary analysis
showed the relationship to be monotonic, as assessed by visual inspection of a scatterplot.
There was a negative correlation between “quality of relationship” and “length of
tenure,” rs (120) = -.419, p < .001.
For research question number three, “Is there a significant relationship between
the age, gender, race, highest degree achieved, and tenure in their previous position;” a
Spearman’s rank-order correlation found a very weak and statistically non-significant
correlation between highest academic degree attained and length of tenure, rs (119) =
.110, p = .232. A Spearman’s rank-order correlation found a weak and statistically
significant relationship between age range and length of tenure, rs (120) = .266, p = .003.
A point-biserial correlation for gender and length of tenure found a very small and
statistically non-significant correlation between gender and length of tenure, rpb(114) =
.079, p = .401. A one-way ANOVA was unsuccessful at determining correlation between
racial group and length of tenure, and a point-biserial correlation for “white or non-white
racial group” and length of tenure found a very small and statistically non-significant
correlation, rpb(118) = .151, p = .099.
After reviewing the data from the Spearman’s rho, point-bivariate, and ANOVA
analyses, the researcher can address the null hypotheses for research question 3, listed
below:
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1. International school director gender is not significantly related to tenure in
their previous position (H0 is rejected).
2. International school director racial group could not be assessed with one-way
ANOVA because the underlying assumptions were not met. A point-biserial
procedure found a very weak and statistically non-significant correlation
between white racial group and length of tenure (H0 is not rejected).
3. International school director highest degree earned is not significantly related
to tenure in their previous position (H0 is not rejected).
4. International school director age group is significantly related to tenure in
their previous position (H0 is rejected).
Theoretical Implications
As mentioned in the introduction, several theories are proposed to help explain
the political environment within schools and their communities. Theories include the
Dissatisfaction Theory of Democracy (Iannaccone & Lutz, 1970), the Continuous
Participation Theory (Zeigler & Jennings, 1974), and the Decision Output Theory (Wirt
& Kirst, 2005).
The Decision Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005) suggests the governance of
local school boards is affected by the limitations of economic and personnel resources in
local school districts. Another significant notion is the low number of citizens who
actually provide input to school boards. School boards decide which actions to take from
few options, and with limited resources, causing subjectivity and inconsistency in their
decisions. Wirt and Kirst’s (2005) model assumes educational policy-making is innately a
political process that allocates value preferences thorough material (i.e., curriculum). The
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democratic nature of this process is determined by the interrelationships between the
political system and other subsystems of the social environment. Wirt and Kirst (2005)
illustrated these links by describing how subsystems generate inputs of demands on and
supports of the political [school] system. They suggested the school system converts
these inputs or demands into public decisions or outputs, which in turn feed allocated
values back into the social environment. Since school districts lack sufficient resources to
meet each demand placed upon them by the community, they must choose which group’s
demands to act upon and which to dismiss. As a result, the school board may or may not
meet the needs of many of its constituency. Their choice of which concern to address is
generally dependent on whether or not the school board has a clear understanding of the
major issues in their respective communities.
The Decision Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005) is the theory most likely to
predict superintendent turnover may be caused by the relationship between the board and
superintendent. This theory deals with the internal interactions within the school board as
they debate the management of limited resources. This theory suggests that perhaps a
superintendent and school board relationship could sour due to a disagreement over
policy decisions and allocation of resources. The possibility of superintendent turnover
caused by relationship issues (and not only board turnover) is supported more by the
Decision Output theory than by either the Dissatisfaction Theory (Iannaccone & Lutz,
1970) or the Continuous Participation Theory.
This particular study did not provide findings leading to theoretical significance
regarding superintendent turnover theory. However, if we were to assume that the
relationship is a significant factor in international school director turnover, then one could
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argue that indeed The Decision Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005) is strengthened
because it contends the governance of local school boards is affected by the limitations of
economic and personnel resources in local school districts. Another significant notion is
the low number of citizens who actually provide input to school boards. School boards
decide which actions to take from few options, and with limited resources, causing
subjectivity and inconsistency in their decisions. This could suggest that local community
issues have little influence on the Board and the relationship with the superintendent is
more of a factor in tenure, but what is happening in the community is indeed a factor.
Again, this is operating under the assumption that relationship is not a factor, which the
researcher found evidence of according to this study. As indicated by the findings and
descriptive data seem to indicate the quality of relationship between the international
school director and the school board as a possible factor for international school directors
to leave their previous position. Additionally, to further complicate this issue,
international schools rarely have school boards that are elected, with only 25% of
respondents in the questionnaire responding to question 4, “Was your School Board...
Elected, Appointed, N/A or Other.” Further research would need to be conducted
specifically looking at elected boards and their relationship with their superintendent and
the superintendent tenure of those communities. Furthermore, how international school
boards are elected would also be a factor, because their election process would vary from
what we are familiar with in the United States due to the expatriate community and the
overall consistent turnover of School Boards in international communities in general.
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Practical Implications
There seems to be evidence that when the top administrator leaves, the entire
organizational structure is affected, regardless of the professional setting (Alsbury,
2008a, 2015; Alsbury &Whitaker, 2015; Waters & Marzano, 2007). While existing
studies have concluded that turnover of the top administrator often revolves around poor
board/executive relations, regardless of the reason for turnover, this phenomenon may
cause difficulties in recruiting and securing the next top management position. Although
a school organization is in crisis, it may present a lucrative, yet arduous opportunity for
the successor who is hired to solve these acute problems.
For sitting superintendents looking to move to a new school or for administrators
aspiring to be a superintendent, using the findings in the research explored in this paper
would allow a more analytical approach on whether or not to apply for the job. Some of
the research would prove extremely valuable in regards to the turnover rate with the
school board. Additionally, understanding the theoretical constructs of the rationale for
superintendent turnover would help a potential candidate understand the history of the
position.
As an aspiring superintendent, research around the causes of superintendent
turnover would prove to be extremely valuable because it would give the incoming
superintendent information about why the job was lost—a handbook of “what not to do”
if you will. Moreover, providing information like this could help build and bridge
relationships with the school board by creating systems that are transparent and based on
the questionnaire data. Further analysis as to what exactly went wrong with the school
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board and superintendent relationship could provide information on how each board
member communicates and what each board member expects.
Several implications were found from the results of this study which could have a
far reaching impact on current educational leaders as well as those who are aspiring to
those positions. Relationship with the school board is the key. Regardless of a school
leader’s preparation, his/her career experience, and areas of expertise- if the
superintendent cannot get along with the school board, it has been suggested that their
tenure would be short (Achilles, 1997; Blumberg, 1985; Dlugosh, 1997; Fullan, 2002;
Hoyle et al., 2005; Sharp, 1994). Despite the prediction that superintendent/school board
relationship is critical to superintendent tenure, no previous studies directly tested that
hypothesis.
It seems evident that the understanding of building a positive relationship between
the international school director and school board, founded on trust and respect, is one
that has a far-reaching impact on the length of tenure. Descriptive statistics from the
study seem to support this claim as 43 out of 77 (56%) directors who left their previous
position in four years reported a negative relationship with their previous school board.
Taking the time and effort to create a positive relationship, both in everyday
contact and in those situations where the superintendent is able to participate in a board
retreat or make away time, is something that most leaders know, but of which they
probably just need to be reminded. The other aspect to this relationship is the importance
of understanding the roles of each side. Several respondents reported in question 15 that
the board micromanaged decisions and thus their relationship was “poor” or “very poor”
as indicated on question 14. Understanding the role of the director and the school board
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can help with the relationship between the director and the school board, which would
help with the increase in tenure.
This particular study did not provide findings leading to theoretical significance
regarding superintendent turnover theory. However, if we were to assume that the
relationship is not a significant factor in international school director turnover, then one
could argue that indeed a practical implication would be that training for school boards
and international school directors should focus on improving relationships and
communication between the school community and the board and superintendent
together; not just necessarily between the school board and superintendent.
Limitations of the Study
Data were gathered on international school directors through a questionnaire that
included director gender, race, age, highest degree achieved, and tenure in their previous
position of international school directors. Each respondent who completed the
questionnaire was asked to respond to an open-ended question explaining why they left
their last position. The data were analyzed to determine whether the relationship between
the school board and the international school director is linked to tenure in their previous
position. Furthermore, data were collected from respondents to see if tenure in their
previous position was impacted by a variety of variables, such as: age, gender race, and
highest degree achieved. One limitation may be the sample size of the international
school directors. However, 155 out of 306 responses (51%) is considered adequate for the
analysis methods used in this study. Another possible limitation to the study would be the
collection of self-reported responses from international school directors regarding their
relationship with their previous school board. No data was collected regarding the school
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board viewpoint on said relationship.
Recommendations for Future Research
As previously mentioned, only two studies to date have measured explicitly, the
reasons for the turnover of international school directors (Hodgson & Chuck, 2015; Moos
& Paulsen, 2014). Studies across the United States have mainly been descriptive in
nature, simply presenting tenure statistics for one or more time periods (Glass et al.,
2000; Kowalski et al., 2010; Natkin et al., 2002). Furthermore, qualitative studies
generally report data from case studies, interviews, and small-scale surveys, raising
concerns that the conclusions drawn from this research are not representative (Monteith
& Hallums, 1989; Peterson & Fusarelli, 2005; Tallerico & Burstyn, 1996). There is a
need for a more holistic study, similar to Alsbury (2003) with quantitative and qualitative
methods, encompassing a representative percentage of superintendents across the world,
from a variety of school sizes, countries, for-profit and non-profit statuses, and with a
wide representation of minority and non-minority international school directors as
descriptive statistics.
Additionally, further research should examine the reasons why the superintendent
turns over with a more qualitative approach to fully encompass the reasons for leaving
the superintendency.
In order to continue to explore the theoretical aspects of this topic, the researcher
suggests further research would need to be conducted specifically looking at elected
boards and their relationship with their superintendent and the superintendent tenure of
those communities. Furthermore, how international school boards are elected would also
be a factor, because their election process would vary from what we are familiar with in

89
the United States due to the expatriate community and the overall consistent turnover of
School Boards in international communities in general.
Based on Figure 11, showing no respondents from four ethnicities, it is worth
further investigating the role of race in employment as an international school director.
Summary
This study was organized into five chapters along with cited references, the blank
questionnaire and relevant appendices. The first chapter provided an overview of the
research project. It included an introduction, problem statement, purpose, significance,
glossary of terms and a summary. The second chapter provided a relevant, current review
of the literature regarding superintendent turnover and the causes for such turnover. The
third chapter explained the research methodology, research questions, procedures, the
null hypotheses, and the analysis methods. The third chapter also described the scope and
limitations of the study, population and sample, survey instrument and the data collection
procedures and a summary. The fourth chapter presented the findings along with the
analysis of the data and its interpretation, based upon quantitative testing and qualitative
inquiry. Furthermore, it reported the analysis using Spearman’s rho, point-biserial
correlation, and a one-way ANOVA. The fifth and last chapter provided summaries,
implications (both practical and theoretical), future study recommendations and
conclusions. As previously mentioned, only two studies to date have measured explicitly,
the reasons for the turnover of international school directors (Hodgson & Chuck, 2015;
Moos & Paulsen, 2014).
Finally, as mentioned in the limitations of the study section of this chapter, no
data were collected from school board members. The results would provide a unique
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analysis to compare the self-reported relationship of a school board versus the selfreported relationship views of the international school director. However, this is very
difficult to do in the international arena, as school board members experience frequent
turnover and are difficult to track down. Consequently, no research using international
school board member data is known.

91
References
Achilles, C. M. (1997). Chad: System entry sets the stage. In C. H. Chapman (Ed.),
Becoming a superintendent: Challenges of school district leadership (pp. 67-80).
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Allen, P. R. (1998). Reasons for involuntary nonextensions of Missouri public school
superintendent contracts in 1996. Dissertation Abstracts International, 59(9),
3292A.
Alsbury, T. L. (2003). Superintendent and school board member turnover: Political
versus apolitical turnover as a critical variable in the application of the
Dissatisfaction Theory. Educational Administration Quarterly, 39(5), 667-698.
Alsbury, T. L. (Ed.). (2008a). The future of school board governance: Relevancy and
revelation. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Alsbury, T. L. (2008b). Superintendent and school board member turnover: Political
versus apolitical turnover as a critical variable in the application of the
dissatisfaction theory. Leadership and Policy in Schools, 7(2), 202-229.
Alsbury, T. L. (2015). Hitting a moving target: How politics determines the changing
roles of superintendents and school boards. In B. S. Cooper, J. G. Cibulka, & L.
D. Fusarelli (Eds.), Handbook of education politics and policy (2nd ed.) (pp. 3761). New York, NY: Routledge.
Alsbury, T. L., & Gore, P. (Eds.) (2015). Improving school board effectiveness: A
Balanced Governance approach. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press.

92
Alsbury, T. L., & Whitaker, K. S. (2015). District superintendents as instructional
leaders? In G. Ivory, A. Hyle, R. McClellan, & M. Acker-Hocevar (Eds.),
Quandaries of the small-district superintendency (pp. 35-54). New York, NY:
Palgrave-MacMillan.
Bennis, W. (1989). Why leaders can’t lead: The unconscious conspiracy continues. San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Blumberg, A. (1985). The school superintendent: Living with conflict. New York, NY:
Teacher College Press.
Carter, G. R., & Cunningham, W. G. (1997). The American school superintendent:
Leading in an age of pressures. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Chance, E. W., & Capps, J. L. (1990). Administrator stability in rural schools: The
school board factor. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma, Department of
Educational Leadership and Policy Studies. (ERIC Document Reproduction
Service No. ED 331681)
Chance, E. W., & Capps, J. L. (1992). Superintendent instability in small/rural schools:
The school board perspective. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma, Department
of educational leadership and policy studies. ERIC Document Reproduction
Service No. ED 350121)
Chingos, M., Whitehurst, G., & Lindquist, K. (2014). School superintendents: Vital or
irrelevant? Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, Brown Center on
Educational Policy.

93
Cooper, B. S., Fusarelli, L. D., & Carella, V. A. (2000). Career crisis in the
superintendency? The results of a national survey. Arlington, VA. American
Association of School Administrators. Retrieved from http://www.eric.ed.gov
Cuban. L. (1988). The managerial imperative and the practice of leadership in schools.
Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Cuban, L. (1998). Transforming the frog into a prince: Effective schools research, policy
and practice at the district level. Harvard Educational Review, 54(2), 129-151.
Danzberger, J., Kirst, M. W., & Usdan, M. D. (1992). Governing public schools: New
times, new requirements. Washington, DC: Institute for Educational Leadership.
Danzberger, J. P., & Usdan, M. D. (1994). Local education governance: Perspectives on
problems and strategies for change. Phi Delta Kappan, 75(5), 366.
Dlugosh, L. L. (1994). Why administrators move: Factors contributing to the turnover of
school administrators in Nebraska. Lincoln, NB: Department of Educational
Administration. (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 375505)
Dlugosh, L. L. (1997). Laura: Providing focus by managing attention and meaning. In C.
H. Chapman (Ed.), Becoming a superintendent: Challenges of school district
leadership (pp. 161-170). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Eaton, W. E., & Sharp, W. L. (1996). Involuntary turnover among small-town
superintendents. Peabody Journal of Education, 71(2), 78–85.
Education Writers Association. (n.d.). Effective superintendents, effective boards:
Finding the right fit. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from
www.ewa.org/library/2004/leadership.pdf

94
Farkas, S., Johnson, J., & Duffett, A. (2003). Rolling up their sleeves. New York, NY:
Public Agenda. Retrieved from http://www.publicagenda.org
Farkas, S., Johnson, J., Duffett, A., & Foleno, T. (2001). Trying to stay ahead of the
game. New York, NY: Public Agenda. Retrieved from
http://www.publicagenda.org
Farrar, E. (1990). Reflections on the first wave of reform: Reordering America’s
educational priorities. In S. L. Jacobson & J. A. Conway (Eds.), Educational
leadership in an age of reform (pp. 3-13). White Plains, NY: Longman.
Field, A. (2013). Discovering statistics using IBM SPSS Statistics (4th ed.). London, UK:
SAGE.
Fowler, F. J., Jr. (2013). Survey research methods. London, UK: SAGE.
Fullan, M. (2002). The change leader. Educational Leadership, 59(8), 16-20.
Fusarelli, B. C., Alsbury, T., Bitting, P., Brady, K., Brinson, K., Fusarelli, L., & Militello,
M. (2010). Preparing transformational leaders for 21st century skills. Academic
Exchange Quarterly. 14(3).
Fusarelli, L. D., Cooper, B. S., & Carella, V. A. (2003). Who will serve? An analysis of
superintendent occupational perceptions, career satisfaction, and mobility.
Journal of School Leadership, 13(3), 304-327.

95
Gardner, D. P., Larsen, Y. W., Baker, W. O., Campbell, A., Crosby, E., Foster, C. A., . . .
Wallace, R. (1983). A nation at risk: The imperative for educational reform. An
open letter to the American people. A report to the nation and the Secretary of
Education. Washington, DC: National Commission on Excellence in Education,
U.S. Department of Education. Retrieved from
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED226006.pdf
Giles, S., & Giles, D. E. (1990). Superintendent turnover: Crisis facing California school
districts. (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 325082)
Glass T., Bjork, L., & Brunner, C. (2000). The study of the American school
superintendency 2000. Arlington, VA: American Association of School
Administrators.
Glass, T. E., & Franceschini, L. A. (2007). The state of the American school
superintendency: A mid-decade study. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Education.
Goodman, R. H., & Zimmerman, W. G., Jr. (2000). Thinking differently:
Recommendations for 21st Century school board/superintendent leadership,
governance, and teamwork for high student achievement. Washington DC:
Education Commission of the States. Retrieved from http://www.nesdec.org
Grady, M., & Bryant, M. (1989). Critical incidents between superintendents and school
boards: Implications for practice. Planning & Changing, 20(4), 206-213.
Grady, M., & Bryant, M. (1991). A study of frequent superintendent turnover in a rural
school district: The constituent’s perspective. Journal of Rural and Small Schools
4(3), 10-13.

96
Grissom J. A. (2010). The determinants of conflict on governing boards in public
organizations: The case of California school boards. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, 20(3), 601-627.
Guarino, C., Santibanez, L., & Daley, G. (2006). Teacher recruitment and retention: A
review of the recent empirical literature. Review of Educational Research, 72(2),
173–208.
Harvey, J. (2003). The urban superintendent: Creating great schools while surviving on
the job. Orlando, FL: Council of Great City Schools. Retrieved from
www.cgcs.org/pdfs/UrbanSuptReprot.pdf
Hodgson, A., & Chuck, M. (Eds.). (2015). Governance in international schools [Amazon
Kindle edition]. Bristol, UK: SRA Books.
Hosman, C. M. (1990). Superintendent selection and dismissal: A changing community
defines its values. Urban Education, 25(3), 350–369.
Hoyle, J., Bjork, L., Collier, V., & Glass, T. (2005). The superintendent as CEO.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin.
Iannaccone, L., & Lutz, F. W. (1970). Politics, power and policy: The governing of local
school districts. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill.
Iannaccone, L., & Lutz, F. W. (1994). The crucible of democracy: The local arena.
Journal of Educational Policy, 9(5), 39-52.
Jennings, M. K., & Zeigler, L. H. (1968). School board and school superintendent study,
1968. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Survey Research.
https://dd.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR07353.v1
Key, V. O. (1955). Southern politics. New York, NY: Knopf.

97
Kowalski, T. J. (1999). The school superintendent: Theory, practice, and cases.
Columbus, OH: Merrill.
Kowalski, T. J., McCord, R. S., Petersen, G. J., Young, P., Ellerson, N. M. (2010). The
American school superintendent: 2010 decennial study. Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield.
Laerd Statistics. (2015). Spearman’s correlation using SPSS statistics. Statistical
tutorials and software guides. Retrieved from https://statistics.laerd.com/
Lutz, F. W., & Iannaccone, L. (1986, Feb.). The dissatisfaction theory of American
democracy: A guide for politics in local school districts. Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the American Association of School Administrators, San
Francisco, CA.
McCurdy, J., & Hymes, D. L. (1992). Building better board-administrator relations. An
AASA Critical Issues Report. Arlington, VA: American Association of School
Administrators.
Metzger, C. (1997). Involuntary turnover of superintendents. Thrust for Educational
Leadership, 26(4), 20-23.
Monteith D. S., & Hallums M. B. (1989). The exodus of South Carolina superintendents.
Retrieved from ERIC database. (ED311531)
Moos, L., & Paulsen, J. M. (Eds.). (2014). School boards in the governance process.
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer International.
Mosca, G. (1939). The ruling class. New York, NY: McGraw Hill.

98
Mountford, M. (2008). Historical and current tensions among board-superintendent
teams: Symptoms or cause? In T. L. Alsbury (Ed.), The future of school board
governance: Relevancy and revelation (pp. 81-114). Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield.
National School Boards Association. (2001). CUBE survey report: Superintendent
tenure. Alexandria, VA: Author. Retrieved from
http://www.nsba.org/cube/supt_tenure.pdf
Natkin, G., Cooper, C., Fusarelli, L., Alborano, J., Padilla, A., & Ghosh, S. (2002). Myth
of the revolving-door superintendency: Contrary to perception, tenure runs much
longer than most believe, a research review finds. School Administrator, 59(5),
28–31.
Parker, P. (1996). Superintendent vulnerability and mobility. Peabody Journal of
Education, 71(2), 64-77.
Petersen, G. J., & Fusarelli, L. D. (Eds.). (2005). The politics of leadership:
Superintendents and school boards in changing times. Greenwich, CT:
Information Age Publishing.
Rausch, L. M. (2001). Factors contributing to exits from the superintendency in Indiana.
Dissertation Abstracts International, 62(4), 1290A.
Reischauer, E. O. (1973). Towards the 21st century: Education for a changing world.
New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
Richardson, L. M. (1998). Stress in the superintendency: Implications for achieving
excellence. Retrieved May 10, 2014 from
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED427421.pdf

99
Sharp, W. L. (1994). Superintendent vulnerability and the bottom line. Carbondale, IL:
Southern Illinois University. (ERIC Document Reproduction Services No. ED
384117)
Sharp, W. L., & Walter, J. K. (2003). The principal as school manager (2nd ed.).
Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
Tallerico, M., & Burstyn, J. N. (1996). Retaining women in the superintendency: The
location matters. Educational Administration Quarterly, 32(1 Suppl), 642–664.
U.S. Department of Education, NCES. (2002). Overview of public elementary and
secondary schools and districts: School year 2000-01 (NCES 2002–356).
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Department of Education, NCES. (2009). The condition of education 2009 (NCES
2009–081). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Waters, J. T., & Marzano, R. J. (2007). The primacy of superintendent leadership. School
Administrator, 64(3), 10-16.
Weninger, T. A., & Stout, R. T. (1989). Dissatisfaction theory: Policy change as a
function of school board member-superintendent turnover. Educational
Administration Quarterly, 25(2), 162–180.
Wirt, F. M., & Kirst, M. W. (2005). The political dynamics of American education (3rd
ed.). Berkeley, CA: McCutchan.
Yee, G., & Cuban, L. (1996). When is tenure long enough? A historical analysis of
superintendent turnover and tenure in urban school districts. Educational
Administration Quarterly, 32(Suppl. 1), 615–641

100
Zeigler, L. H., & Jennings, M. K. (1974). Governing American schools. North Scituate,
MA: Duxbury.

101
Appendix A: Informed Consent and Questionnaire

Informed Consent
International School Director Turnover as Influenced by
School Board/Director Relationship

Introduction
Welcome, and thank you for your interest! I am a doctoral student in the Seattle
Pacific University Educational Leadership program and am conducting a research study
for my dissertation.
Investigator
Zakariya Palsha., who is a doctoral candidate at Seattle Pacific University in
Seattle, Washington is conducting this research. Mr. Palsha can be reached at 206-8688618 or at palshaz@spu.edu. Mr. Palsha is employed by Fawzia Sultan International
School in Kuwait, but this research is solely his own and is not sponsored by his
employer. Mr. Palsha is working under the faculty advisor, Dr. Tom Alsbury who can be
reached at 206-378-5099 or at alsburyt@spu.edu.
Purpose
The purpose of this study will be to examine the self-reported causes of turnover
of international school directors. Using a theoretical framework of the Decision-Output
Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005), this study explores possible reasons for international school
director tenure in previous positions. To date, only two studies have measured explicitly,
the reasons for the turnover of international school directors (Hodgson & Chuck, 2015;
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Moos & Paulsen, 2014). This study narrows the focus on the relationship between school
boards and international school directors, through use of a questionnaire of international
school directors from South America, Europe, Africa, Asia and Southeast Asia. You have
been invited to take part in a research study. It will take about 20 minutes to complete.
You are being invited to participate because you are belong to the listerve HeadNet and
are currently working as an international school director. Your participation is invaluable
to this study.
Procedures
Each administrator will be sent an introductory email from the investigator with a
brief description of the study, the researcher, and instructions on how to access the web
based questionnaire. The email will explain that the questionnaire itself is voluntary, and
the anonymity of the participants will be protected. The questionnaire data will be
returned to me via email, but the IP address will be masked and there is no way to
identify respondents. Data will be coded numerically in excel so no to duplicate
information.
Risks and Discomforts
There are no known inherent risks in or discomforts in voluntarily completing this
online questionnaire. A commercial online questionnaire will be used, however, despite
this effort; transfer of information across the Internet is not secure and could be observed
by a third party. To varying degrees, this is fundamental aspect of all Internet activity and
communications. If you choose to respond to this questionnaire on a computer and/or
network owned or accessible by a third party, such as your employer, then such persons
may be able to view your responses. You may be able to increase your privacy protection
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by using a limited access computer and by closing your browser window after completing
the questionnaire.
Benefits
There are no known direct benefits to completing this voluntary online
questionnaire. However, there may be benefits that emerge through a greater
understanding of turnover for international school directors.
Participation and Alternatives to Participation
Your participation is voluntary. Your participation is important, but is voluntary.
There is no penalty for not taking part, nor any benefit to taking part. Your participation
is strictly for the purpose of the researcher’s study, and you may decline to participate. If
you do choose to participate, your responses will contribute to understanding of
international school director turnover.
Confidentiality
The information in the study records will be kept confidential. It is the intent of
the researcher that your participation and your responses be anonymous. This means that
no one will know that the information you give came from you. The researcher will make
no attempt to personally identify respondents. Data will be kept securely and only
available to the researcher(s) conducting the study. No reference will be made in oral or
written reports that could link you to the study. The de-identified data may be used for
future research, presentation, or for teaching purposes by the Principal Investigator listed
above.
Subject Rights
If you have questions at any time about the study or procedures (or if you
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experience adverse effects as a result of participating in this study), you may contact the
Principal Investigator Mr. Palsha who can be reached at 206-868-8618 or at
palshaz@spu.edu If you have questions about your rights as a participant, contact the
SPU Institutional Review Board Chair at 206-281-2201 or IRB@SPU.edu
How to Participate (Consent)
If you wish to participate in the study and you confirm that you are 18 years of
age or older, please click on the CONTINUE button below. By clicking on the
CONTINUE button, you are affirming that you are at least 18 years of age and that you
give your voluntary consent to participate in this study.
Directions: Please indicate your opinion about each of the questions below by
marking one of the responses. Your answers are confidential. There are no right or wrong
answers, so please answer all questions honestly. If you are unsure about how to answer a
question, then please choose what you feel is the best response. Please read each question
carefully and respond to each of the questions.

International School Administrator Questionnaire
Questionnaire Page 1: Welcome
Thank you for helping with my research, which is part of my doctoral work at Seattle
Pacific University (SPU). I hope it will ultimately benefit all International Schools and
administrators by providing better information for decision making.
This study investigates some realities faced by International School superintendents,
directors, and administrators. Members of internet forums for International School
administrators are invited to participate.
This questionnaire is completely voluntary. It has 15 questions, and most people will
complete it in less than 5 minutes. You may skip any questions that you do not wish to
answer. Approximately 300 people are invited to participate. I hope to get approximately
100 completed questionnaires for statistical analysis.
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Your anonymity and confidentiality are assured. The questions are about your previous
position (not your current position), and no personally identifiable information is asked.
SurveyMonkey.com will log the IP address you used, but I do not have access to it, and I
cannot associate answers with individuals.
This study has been assigned SPU Institutional Review Board (IRB) number 161706015.
If you have any questions or concerns about this research, please email me: Zak Palsha,
palshaz@spu.edu
Also, you may contact the SPU IRB Office -- IRB@SPU.edu -- for information about the
rights of human subjects in SPU-approved research.
Thank you,
Zak Palsha
Questionnaire Page 2: Previous Position
We are conducting research on the state of affairs for superintendents, directors, and
other top administrators at International Schools. All information will be anonymous and
confidential. Please tell us a bit about your previous position.
1. In your previous position, were you an international □ Yes
school director/superintendent or administrator?
□ No
2. Was your school
□ For Profit
□ Non-Profit
3. Did you report to a Board of Directors / Education? □ Yes
□ No (please explain)
4. Was your School Board … ?
□ Elected
□ Appointed
□ N/a or Other (please explain)
5. What was the enrollment of your school?
□ Small (500 or fewer students)
□ Medium (501 to 1500
students)
□ Large (over 1500 students)
6. Did your organization require a superintendent or
□ Yes
□ Not sure
director certificate?
□ No
7. What was your position title?
(Open text box)
Questionnaire Page 3: Demographic Information
Please tell a bit about your demographics. All information will be anonymous and
confidential.
8. Your age (select a range)
□ 20 – 29
□ 30 – 39
□ 40 – 49
□ 50 – 59
□ 60 – 69
□ 70+
9. Your gender
□ Male
□ Female
10. Highest degree achieved
□ Bachelor’s
□ Ph.D. / Ed. D.
□ Master’s
□ Other (please
explain)
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11. Race / Ethnicity

□ Arabic
□ Asian
□ Black (African)
□ Hispanic
□ Indigenous Australian
□ Native American / Alaskan
□ Pacific Islander
Native
□ White (European /
□ Persian
Caucasian)
□ Other (please specify)
Questionnaire Page 4: Career Moves
Please tell us more about your position changes.
12. Years in previous position:
□ Less than 1 □ 1
□2
□3
□4
□5
□6
□7
□8
□9
□ 10
□ 11
□ 12
□ 13
□ 14
□ 15
□ 16
□ 17
□ 18
□ 19
□ 20
□ 21
□ 22
□ 23
□ 24
□ 25
□ 26
□ 27
□ 28
□ 29
□ 30 or
more
13. Please describe your reason for leaving your previous
(Open text box)
position.
Questionnaire Page 5: Board
Please tell us about your school board / board of directors / board of education.
14. Please rate your relationship with your previous
□ Very Good Relationship
school board on the following scale (choose one).
□ Good Relationship
□ Neutral
□ Poor Relationship
□ Very Poor Relationship
15. Please add any additional information regarding
(Open text box)
your previous turnover and the relationship with the
board.
Questionnaire Page 6: Thank You
Thank you for your time and feedback. I sincerely appreciate your support.
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Appendix B: Categorized Reasons for Leaving the Previous Position
To generate the categorical variable that represented respondents’ reason for
leaving their previous position, the researcher applied an emergent theme method to the
responses from open-ended question 13, “Describe your reason for leaving your previous
position.” In some cases, to determine categorization, the researcher also used
information from Likert-scale question 14, “Please rate your relationship with your
previous school board on the following scale (choose one: Very Good Relationship,
Good Relationship, Neutral, Poor Relationship, Very Poor Relationship)” and openended question 15, “Please add any additional information regarding your previous
turnover and the relationship with the board.” The cases are listed here.
All responses in the Q. 13 and Q. 15 columns are reproduced here verbatim,
including spelling, grammatical, usage, and typographical errors.

Board
“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Board;” n=34
Case Q. 13: Please describe
ID
your reason for leaving
your previous position.
1 Needed a change /
change of board
3 multiple reasons: budget,
Board
5 Issues with ownership
and board of trustees
7 Personal, wanted a new
country and didn’t like
the direction we were
going

Q. 14: Please rate
your relationship
with your previous
school board ...
Poor Relationship

Q. 15: Please add any additional
information regarding your previous
turnover and the relationship with the
board.
[No response]

Very Poor
Relationship
Very Poor
Relationship
Very Poor
Relationship

Most unprofessional Board I have
worked with
We did not align philosophically
Board didn’t listen to my advice. It
was time for change. They wanted a
manager and not a leader
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“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Board;” n=34
Case Q. 13: Please describe
ID
your reason for leaving
your previous position.
10 conflict with owner
group
13 Conflict with owner
15 Fired
17 I had a very big conflict
with the managing
director and he was
supported by ownership
18 board Interference

Q. 14: Please rate
your relationship
with your previous
school board ...
Very Poor
Relationship
Very Poor
Relationship
Very Poor
Relationship
Poor Relationship

Q. 15: Please add any additional
information regarding your previous
turnover and the relationship with the
board.
I would rather not say

Very Poor
Relationship

Promises were made to staff then not
kept. I was in the position of having
to face staff with re these broken
promises
[No response]

22 difference of opinion
with board
25 Forced to Retire

Poor Relationship

27 Mission and vision took
a drastic turn and I could
not be that flexible.
28 Did not agree with
shareholders; contract
expired
29 Owner and Board of
Directors conflict
30 Left for personal reasons
related to health
36 End of contract and BOG
issues
38 Conflict with owner and
board of governors
41 The BOArd changed and
I was not offered a
contract beyond my
initial 3 year contract
42 Mutual decision to move
on

Very Good
Relationship

Poor Relationship

Very Poor
Relationship

Board micromanaged all decisions
They did not listen to my experience
The board supported the ownership

The Board of Trustees forced me to
retire, stating age as a factor
The top board members left, sort of
politics, and that too played a part in
my leaving.
Shareholders were not educators and
were only after profit

Very Poor
Relationship
Very Poor
Relationship
Very Poor
Relationship
Very Poor
Relationship
Very Poor
Relationship

[No response]

Very Poor
Relationship

Micromanaged by owner and board

Distinction at the board level causes
my health issues
Did not agree with BOG....
micromanaged too much
Unprofessional
[No response]
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“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Board;” n=34
Case Q. 13: Please describe
ID
your reason for leaving
your previous position.
43 did not agree with
stakeholders........ they
have no idea about
education
46 Complex issues
55 Working for a ‘forprofit’ school was not
what I expected
58 priorities keep shifting
and there’s no vision
59 Not a good fit
64 Conflict of interest, the
board of trustees is not a
real board,
68 conflict with
stakeholders and contract
was not renewed
73 change of direction from
stakeholders
83 disagreement with
Board/Owner group
86 Did not meet board
objectives
91 Complicated...the school
could get new direction
...but also Board relations
had reached a low from
which there could be no
recovery
99 Micromanagement from
2 founding trustees.

Q. 14: Please rate
your relationship
with your previous
school board ...
Poor Relationship

Q. 15: Please add any additional
information regarding your previous
turnover and the relationship with the
board.
they were after money and I did not
agree with that

Very Poor
Relationship
Very Poor
Relationship

Board astranged

Very Poor
Relationship
Poor Relationship
Very Poor
Relationship

Board follows flavor of the month;
does not have a Visio
[No response]
[No response]

Neutral

[No response]

Neutral

[No response]

Very Poor
Relationship
Poor Relationship

Micromanaged every decision

Good Relationship

Neutral

the for profit attitude got in the way

Board was not reasonable with their
demands
As mentioned - for 15 years it was
Good to Very Good at the last 2 years
the relationship went little by little
into the porcelain
Founders wanted a world-class
program without enough funding.
They had a chaotic financial aide
criteria and policy that was making
impossible to even break even. Over
50% of the students received
financial assistance.
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“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Board;” n=34
Case Q. 13: Please describe
ID
your reason for leaving
your previous position.
103 My contract was not
renewed by the Board.

105 Unhappy and
dysfunctional school
111 Board of Owners broke
verbal contract
agreement.

Q. 14: Please rate
your relationship
with your previous
school board ...
Poor Relationship

Neutral

Q. 15: Please add any additional
information regarding your previous
turnover and the relationship with the
board.
My previous school’s board structure
and governing bylaws was seriously
flawed, resulting in great turnover
and personal-interest board member
agendas.
[No response]

Good Relationship

No other comment

Environmental
“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Environmental;” n=28
Case Q. 13: Please describe
ID
your reason for
leaving your previous
position.
4
6
11
12
14
19

Q. 14: Please rate
your relationship
with your
previous school
board ...
Fours years in Saudi
Good
was enough
Relationship
Needed a change
Good
Relationship
Personal reasons
Neutral
It was interim position Good
Relationship
time for a change,
Poor Relationship
personal
Needed a change.... 5 Good
years in Nigeria is a
Relationship
long time

21 I would rather not say
23 Time to move on

Very Poor
Relationship
Very Good
Relationship

Q. 15: Please add any additional
information regarding your
previous turnover and the
relationship with the board.
[No response]
None
[No response]
[No response]
It was good I left
There were no members from the
original board that hired me left
when I left after 5 years. I got
along with the board members
professionally but that was it.
They were very unprofessional
[No response]
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“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Environmental;” n=28
Case Q. 13: Please describe
ID
your reason for
leaving your previous
position.
33 School closed
44 Time for a change, I
did what I could for
the organization
50 Moved country
51 Relocation
63 Personal reasons
69 moved to a warmer
climate
71 my kids graduated so
I wanted to move
74 War stricken country
77 Changed schools
80 pursue my PHD
87 4 years in Saudi is
long enough
89 Personal
92 My father died,
needed to help my
mother
95 Enough time there,
felt I’d done what I
wanted. Also
significant was the
age of my kids
(transitioning to
middle school)
102 Wanted a new
challenge.

Q. 14: Please rate
your relationship
with your
previous school
board ...
Very Good
Relationship
Neutral

Q. 15: Please add any additional
information regarding your
previous turnover and the
relationship with the board.

Good
Relationship
Very Good
Relationship
Very Poor
Relationship
Good
Relationship
Very Good
Relationship
Very Good
Relationship
Good
Relationship
Neutral
Good
Relationship
Poor Relationship
Very Good
Relationship

[No response]

Very Good
Relationship

In five years, I had two very
difficult years with the Board one
okay and two very good.

Neutral

[No response]

[No response]
None

[No response]
[No response]
[No response]
[No response]
[No response]
[No response]
[No response]
[No response]
just wasn’t a pleasant post
Best Board I ever worked with!
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“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Environmental;” n=28
Case Q. 13: Please describe
ID
your reason for
leaving your previous
position.
108 After four years at my
previous school, I had
achieved the goals
(new building project)
and felt it was time to
move on to a new
school and fresh goals
110 family reasons

Q. 14: Please rate
your relationship
with your
previous school
board ...
Good
Relationship

Q. 15: Please add any additional
information regarding your
previous turnover and the
relationship with the board.

Very Good
Relationship

My relationship with the board as a
whole was extremely positive,
though I had challenges with one
board member, which made
working with the whole board
difficult at times
[No response]

113 Relocation

Very Good
Relationship
114 The school enrollment Very Good
was too low to sustain Relationship
the school.

115 Local circumstances
made it too unstable
and dangerous to
continue

Good
Relationship

The decision to leave my previous
school after four years was mine. I
notified the board one year in
advance, and was part of the
selection and transition processes
for the new Director

My relationship with Board
members at my previous position
was very professional. Board
members were supportive and
understanding. They helped when
needed and respected the
Director’s responsibilities without
interfering.
The Board was also unstable, there
was a high turnover rate for ex-pats
in the country

Opportunity
“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Opportunity;” n=24
Case Q. 13: Please
ID
describe your reason
for leaving your
previous position.
8 Went to a bigger
school

Q. 14: Please rate
your relationship
with your previous
school board ...
Neutral

Q. 15: Please add any additional
information regarding your
previous turnover and the
relationship with the board.
[No response]
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“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Opportunity;” n=24
Case Q. 13: Please
ID
describe your reason
for leaving your
previous position.
16 Better position
26 Better opportunity
45 Finish contract and
more money in new
job
52 Moved to another
school
56 bigger school
57 New job better for me
75 Promoted to Director
78 Assigned to lead a
new school
79 I got a promotion to
be a director within
the same school
82 promotion to Director
84 Moved to better
opportunity for me
85 Moved countries;
bigger school
88 Opportunity here in
Doha
93 Carreer move
94 New challenges
96 Voluntary. Looking
for new overseas
adventures
97 Relocation to a new
school, city and
country
101 More responsibility
104 I was promoted to
Director General
106 to become a school
director

Q. 14: Please rate
your relationship
with your previous
school board ...
Very Good
Relationship
Neutral
Poor Relationship

Q. 15: Please add any additional
information regarding your
previous turnover and the
relationship with the board.
No issues with board

Neutral

[No response]

Good Relationship
Neutral
Good Relationship
Very Good
Relationship
Neutral

[No response]
[No response]
[No response]
[No response]

Neutral
Good Relationship

[No response]
[No response]

Good Relationship

No issues

Very Good
Relationship
Very Good
Relationship
Good Relationship
Very Good
Relationship

[No response]

Very Good
Relationship

[No response]

Very Good
Relationship
Good Relationship

[No response]

Neutral

[No response]

[No response]
[No response]

[No response]

[No response]
[No response]
No influence on my leaving

[No response]
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“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Opportunity;” n=24
Case Q. 13: Please
ID
describe your reason
for leaving your
previous position.
116 Professional
advancement;
geographic selection

Q. 14: Please rate
your relationship
with your previous
school board ...
Very Good
Relationship

118 To take another
position in the USA

Very Good
Relationship

Q. 15: Please add any additional
information regarding your
previous turnover and the
relationship with the board.
My previous board had already
extended an additional year
contract to me in hopes that I
would continue there.
Previous position I stayed 5 years the Board was wonderful!

119 New ooportunities
and growth

Good Relationship

[No response]

Contract
“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Contract;” n=20
Case Q. 13: Please
ID
describe your reason
for leaving …
2 contract expired
9 End of fixed contract.

32
34
35
37

Contract expired
Contact expired
contract ended
Contract

39 completion of initial
contract
40 completed contract
48
53
54
61

contract ended
Contract expired
Completed contract
Done with contract

Q. 14: Please rate
your relationship
with your previous
school board ...
Good Relationship
Very Good
Relationship

Poor Relationship
Poor Relationship
Poor Relationship
Very Poor
Relationship
Poor Relationship
Poor Relationship
Poor Relationship
Poor Relationship
Poor Relationship
Poor Relationship

Q. 15: Please add any additional
information regarding your
previous turnover and the
relationship with the board.
[No response]
Contract previous to the one
reported on here: 6 years, good
relationship with the board. Prior
to that, 2 years - worked for an
owner, no board.
[No response]
Did not align with BOT
[No response]
[No response]
Focussed on the wrong things, we
disagreed on key principles
We did not see eye to eye on
critical issues
[No response]
[No response]
Wasn’t a good match for me
[No response]
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“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Contract;” n=20
Case Q. 13: Please
ID
describe your reason
for leaving …

Q. 14: Please rate
your relationship
with your previous
school board ...
62 Expiration of contract Poor Relationship
65 Contract expired

66 Completed my
contract
67 Expiration of my
initial contract,
mutually agreed not
to renew
76 I change jobs every 3
years
81 Initial contract
completed
120 End of contract
121 It was a one year
interim position

Poor Relationship
Poor Relationship

Q. 15: Please add any additional
information regarding your
previous turnover and the
relationship with the board.
board views and my views
differed
board was always split on
decisions, hard to move forward
[No response]

Poor Relationship

Key issues we disagreed on, for
example budget and class size

Neutral

[No response]

Poor Relationship

[No response]

Very Good
Relationship
Very Good
Relationship

[No response]
[No response]

Retirement
“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Retirement;” n=12
Case Q. 13: Please
ID
describe your reason
for leaving your
previous position.
20 Retired, now working
as an interim HoS
24 Retired
31 Retired
47 Retired
49 Retired
60 Retired
72 Retiring

Q. 14: Please rate
your relationship
with your previous
school board ...
Good Relationship

Q. 15: Please add any additional
information regarding your
previous turnover and the
relationship with the board.
[No response]

Neutral
Good Relationship
Good Relationship
Very Good
Relationship
Neutral
Good Relationship

[No response]
[No response]
[No response]
Great working relationship
[No response]
[No response]
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“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Retirement;” n=12
Case Q. 13: Please
ID
describe your reason
for leaving your
previous position.
90 Retirement

98 Retiring

Q. 14: Please rate
your relationship
with your previous
school board ...
Very Good
Relationship

Good Relationship

109 Retirement.

Good Relationship

112 retirement

Very Good
Relationship
Poor Relationship

117 Retirement

Q. 15: Please add any additional
information regarding your
previous turnover and the
relationship with the board.
Generally, I have had over 30
years of success with school
boards, but there are thoses years
when the board mix is not good or
the leadership strong. Elected
boards are a roll of the dice. You
have to work with what you get.
I worked with appointed and
elected Boards; Appointed are far
more rational.objective and
pleasant.
Board turnover was normal for a
school with a Board consisting of
members elected from an
expatriate, internationally mobile
community: Most members
fulfilled their two-year terms; a
few stayed three or more years.
The Board Chair, Board, and
Director normally worked closely
and well in encouraging specific
parents to be nominated and in
developing and revising BoardDirector agreements (annually) on
governance.
healthy international school
community with 50+ nationalities
[No response]
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Appendix C: Cases with evidence of conflict with board as a factor in job
turnover
Of 118 qualified respondents, 58 (49%) indicated there had been a difficult
relationship or conflict with their board of education/board of directors/board of
governors/board of trustees in their answers to questionnaire questions 13, 14, and/or 15.
Question 13 was “Please describe your reason for leaving your previous position.”
An open-ended text box was provided. The researcher used an emergent theme process to
analyze the responses.
Question 14 was “Please rate your relationship with your previous school board
on the following scale (choose one).” A 5-level Likert-type scale was provided, with
choices of: Very Good Relationship, Good Relationship, Neutral, Poor Relationship,
Very Poor Relationship.
Question 15 was “Please add any additional information regarding your previous
turnover and the relationship with the board.” It provided an open-ended text box.
Relatively few respondents answered question 15.
All responses in the Q. 13 and Q. 15 columns are reproduced here verbatim,
including spelling, grammatical, usage, and typographical errors.

3 of 3 answers. Q. 13, Reason for Leaving, Q. 14, Relationship with Board, and
Q. 15, Additional Information, at least partly implicate Board and/or Relationship.
3 of 3 answers indicating conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=19
Case Q. 13: Reason for
Reason
Q. 14:
Q. 15: Additional
ID
Leaving
Category
Relationship Information
3
multiple reasons:
Board
Very Poor
Most unprofessional
budget, Board
Relationship Board I have worked
with
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3 of 3 answers indicating conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=19
Case Q. 13: Reason for
Reason
Q. 14:
Q. 15: Additional
ID
Leaving
Category
Relationship Information
5
Issues with
Board
Very Poor
We did not align
ownership and board
Relationship philosophically
of trustees
7
Personal, wanted a
Board,
Very Poor
Board didn’t listen to my
new country and
Environmental Relationship advice. It was time for
didn’t like the
change. They wanted a
direction we were
manager and not a leader
going
13
Conflict with owner
Board
Very Poor
Board micromanaged all
Relationship decisions
15
Fired
Board
Very Poor
They did not listen to my
Relationship experience
17
I had a very big
Board
Poor
The board supported the
conflict with the
Relationship ownership
managing director
and he was supported
by ownership
18
board Interference
Board
Very Poor
Promises were made to
Relationship staff then not kept. I was
in the position of having
to face staff with re these
broken promises
25
Forced to Retire
Board,
Poor
The Board of Trustees
Retirement
Relationship forced me to retire,
stating age as a factor
28
Did not agree with
Board,
Very Poor
Shareholders were not
shareholders;
Contract
Relationship educators and were only
contract expired
after profit
36
End of contract and
Board
Very Poor
Did not agree with
BOG issues
Relationship BOG.... micromanaged
too much
38
Conflict with owner
Board
Very Poor
Unprofessional
and board of
Relationship
governors
42
Mutual decision to
Board
Very Poor
Micromanaged by owner
move on
Relationship and board
43
did not agree with
Board
Poor
they were after money
stakeholders........
Relationship and I did not agree with
they have no idea
that
about education
46
Complex issues
Board
Very Poor
Board astranged
Relationship
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3 of 3 answers indicating conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=19
Case Q. 13: Reason for
Reason
Q. 14:
Q. 15: Additional
ID
Leaving
Category
Relationship Information
58
priorities keep
Board
Very Poor
Board follows flavor of
shifting and there’s
Relationship the month; does not have
no vision
a Visio
67
Expiration of my
Board,
Poor
Key issues we disagreed
initial contract,
Contract
Relationship on, for example budget
mutually agreed not
and class size
to renew
83
disagreement with
Board
Very Poor
Micromanaged every
Board/Owner group
Relationship decision
86
Did not meet board
Board
Poor
Board was not
objectives
Relationship reasonable with their
demands
103 My contract was not Board,
Poor
My previous school’s
renewed by the
Contract
Relationship board structure and
Board.
governing bylaws was
seriously flawed,
resulting in great
turnover and personalinterest board member
agendas.
2 of 3 answers. Question 13, Reason for Leaving, and Question 14, Relationship with
Board, at least partly implicate Board and/or Relationship.
2 of 3 answers (Q. 13, Q. 14) show conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=7
Case Q. 13: Reason for
Reason Category Q. 14:
Q. 15: Additional
ID
Leaving
Relationship
Information
1
Needed a change /
Board,
Poor
[No response]
change of board
Environmental
Relationship
10
conflict with owner Board
Very Poor
I would rather not
group
Relationship
say
22
difference of
Board
Poor
[No response]
opinion with board
Relationship
29
Owner and Board of Board
Very Poor
[No response]
Directors conflict
Relationship
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2 of 3 answers (Q. 13, Q. 14) show conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=7
Case Q. 13: Reason for
Reason Category Q. 14:
Q. 15: Additional
ID
Leaving
Relationship
Information
41
The BOArd
Board, Contract
Very Poor
[No response]
changed and I was
Relationship
not offered a
contract beyond my
initial 3 year
contract
55
Working for a ‘for- Board,
Very Poor
the for profit
profit’ school was
Environmental
Relationship
attitude got in the
not what I expected
way
64
Conflict of interest, Board
Very Poor
[No response]
the board of trustees
Relationship
is not a real board,
2 of 3 answers. Question 13, Reason for Leaving, and Question 15, Additional
Information, at least partly implicate Board and/or Relationship.
2 of 3 answers (Q. 13, Q. 15) show conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=3
Case Q. 13: Reason for
Reason
Q. 14:
Q. 15: Additional
ID
Leaving
Category Relationship
Information
27 Mission and vision
Board
Very Good
The top board members
took a drastic turn and
Relationship
left, sort of politics, and
I could not be that
that too played a part in
flexible.
my leaving.
91 Complicated...the
Board
Good
As mentioned - for 15
school could get new
Relationship
years it was Good to Very
direction ...but also
Good at the last 2 years
Board relations had
the relationship went little
reached a low from
by little into the porcelain
which there could be
no recovery
99 Micromanagement
Board
Neutral
Founders wanted a worldfrom 2 founding
class program without
trustees.
enough funding. They had
a chaotic financial aide
criteria and policy that
was making impossible to
even break even. Over
50% of the students
received financial
assistance.
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2 of 3 answers. Question 14, Relationship with Board, and Question 15, Additional
Information, at least partly implicate Board and/or Relationship.
2 of 3 answers (Q. 14, Q. 15) show conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=7
Case Q. 13: Reason for
Reason
Q. 14:
Q. 15: Additional
ID
Leaving
Category
Relationship
Information
21
I would rather not
Environmental Very Poor
They were very
say
Relationship
unprofessional
30
Left for personal
Environmental, Very Poor
Distinction at the board
reasons related to
Board
Relationship
level causes my health
health
issues
34
Contact expired
Contract
Poor
Did not align with
Relationship
BOT
39
completion of
Contract
Poor
Focussed on the wrong
initial contract
Relationship
things, we disagreed
on key principles
40
completed contract Contract
Poor
We did not see eye to
Relationship
eye on critical issues
62
Expiration of
Contract
Poor
board views and my
contract
Relationship
views differed
65
Contract expired
Contract
Poor
board was always split
Relationship
on decisions, hard to
move forward
1 of 3 answers. Question 13, Reason for Leaving, at least partly implicates Board
and/or Relationship.
1 of 3 answers (Q. 13) shows conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=3
Case Q. 13: Reason for
Reason
Q. 14: Relationship
Q. 15: Additional
ID
Leaving
Category
Information
68 conflict with
Board
Neutral
[No response]
stakeholders and
contract was not
renewed
73 change of direction
Board
Neutral
[No response]
from stakeholders
111 Board of Owners
Board
Good Relationship
No other comment
broke verbal contract
agreement.
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1 of 3 answers. Question 14, Relationship, implicates Board and/or Relationship.
1 of 3 answers (Q. 14) shows conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=15
Case Q. 13: Reason for
Reason
Q. 14:
Q. 15: Additional
ID
Leaving
Category
Relationship
Information
14 time for a change,
personal
32 Contract expired
35 contract ended
37 Contract
45 Finish contract and
more money in new
job
48 contract ended
53 Contract expired
54 Completed contract
59 Not a good fit
61 Done with contract
63 Personal reasons
66 Completed my
contract
81 Initial contract
completed
89 Personal
117 Retirement

Environmental Poor
Relationship
Contract
Poor
Relationship
Contract
Poor
Relationship
Contract
Very Poor
Relationship
Opportunity
Poor
Relationship

It was good I left

Contract

[No response]

Poor
Relationship
Contract
Poor
Relationship
Contract
Poor
Relationship
Environmental Poor
Relationship
Contract
Poor
Relationship
Environmental Very Poor
Relationship
Contract
Poor
Relationship
Contract
Poor
Relationship
Environmental Poor
Relationship
Retirement
Poor
Relationship

[No response]
[No response]
[No response]
[No response]

[No response]
Wasn’t a good match
for me
[No response]
[No response]
[No response]
[No response]
[No response]
just wasn’t a pleasant
post
[No response]
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1 of 3 answers. Question 15, Additional Information, at least partly implicates
Board and/or Relationship.
1 of 3 answers (Q. 15) shows conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=4
Case Q. 13: Reason for
Reason
Q. 14:
Q. 15: Additional
ID
Leaving
Category
Relationship Information
19 Needed a change.... Environmental Good
There were no members
5 years in Nigeria is
Relationship from the original board
a long time
that hired me left when I
left after 5 years. I got
along with the board
members professionally
but that was it.
95 Enough time there, Environmental Very Good
In five years, I had two
felt I’d done what I
Relationship very difficult years with
wanted. Also
the Board one okay and
significant was the
two very good.
age of my kids
(transitioning to
middle school)
110 family reasons
Environmental Very Good
My relationship with the
Relationship board as a whole was
extremely positive,
though I had challenges
with one board member,
which made working with
the whole board difficult
at times
115 Local
Environmental Good
The Board was also
circumstances
Relationship unstable, there was a high
made it too
turnover rate for ex-pats
unstable and
in the country
dangerous to
continue

